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Abstract 
 
Transformation in NATO has been a recurring and constant theme in the Alliance since DCI 
and PCC, and is an important theme although rebranded as Smart Defense. This thesis has 
sought to identify and map out different institutional logics of what is perceived as 
appropriate by key personnel within and affiliated with the concept, and to analyze the 
concept’s roles and rationale, especially in regard to the overall transformation NATO. Two 
questions have guided this analysis, namely 
1) Which institutional logics that can be identified on how the COE concept and specific 
centers are organized, and  
2) What role(s) do(es) the COE concept play in the field of defense transformation in NATO, 
and what is the concept’s strategic intention, relevance and importance?  
The research question has been answered using a new institutionalist perspective, where the 
purpose has been to understand the rationale of the COE concept. Constructing institutional 
logics and matching the empirical evidence to these logics and their respective theoretical 
expectations has consequently led to the analysis in which I have concluded that a logic of 
defense solidarity and defense pluralism are dominant, as opposed to the less dominant logic 
of sovereignty and the logic of exclusiveness that was not found to be evident at all. 
Furthermore, in analyzing strategic roles I have found that the two most evident roles the 
concept plays in NATO transformation are identifying and supporting specific 
transformational efforts. Finally, I have found it implausible to conclude that COE concept is 
strategic intentional regarded from a NATO transformational perspective, but rather is a 
bottom-up phenomena without central steering. Nevertheless, the concept is strategically 
relevant for NATO transformation in the sense that it is coherent with transformational 
strategic guidelines, and also seems to be an important element although this conclusion needs 
further research and evaluation.  
An executive summary for practitioners and decision-makers is attached in Appendix C. 
 
Word count: appr. 28 500 in total. 
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1 Introduction 
”In sum, as we enter the 21st century, the Euro-Atlantic community - North America 
and Europe together - has to face some tough challenges when it comes to improving 
our capability.” 
– Lord Robertson, NATO’s 10th Secretary General 1999-2003 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) has had 13 summits, occasions where Heads of State and Government 
of NATO member countries meet to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance 
activities. From the summit in Brussels in 1994 to Lisbon in 2010, the summits have dealt 
with the overarching questions on “why we fight” and “how we fight”, and last not least how 
to match the two essential questions with each other. Dealing with these issues in the post-
Cold War era has constantly challenged the Alliance, but it has nevertheless survived into a 
new paradigm where it no longer faces a threat to its territory.  
In order to ensure its relevance, NATO needs to adapt to new internal challenges, 
surroundings, and emerging security threats. This process of adaption is coined 
“transformation”, and focuses on changing the Alliance into a leaner and more relevant 
military organization in order to ensure relevance by aligning capabilities, organization, and 
mindsets with the Alliance’s ambitions. In short, transformation means equipping and 
adapting NATO for the 21st century. This transformation is challenging and time-consuming 
enough on state level. Acquisition of new equipment, changes in large, rigid, and 
institutionalized military structures, adapting doctrines to new technology and equipment and 
not least training to handle them are all challenges, where defense spending continuously 
must be justified to the public, especially in times of austerity.  
However, these challenges reach a new dimension at the level of alliance, in which alliance 
transformation requires sovereign states to pull in the same direction. In the field of defense 
this has proven to be easier said than done. Not only must a state’s defense capabilities, 
organization and mindsets be aligned with its state ambitions, it must also align the state as 
such to NATO capabilities, organization, mindsets and strategic concepts. This means that if 
transformation is to be successful, it must include but also go beyond the purely military 
dimension (Hamilton 2004, pp. 3-24). 
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When NATO decided to go out of area instead of out of business1, its strategic realignment 
depended on a military transformation. The dependence and need for transformation became 
even stronger as the Alliance gained more operational experience in terms of lessons 
identified and lessons learned from the Balkans and then Afghanistan, and indicated that the 
Alliance needed to rethink how it organized and planned its capabilities and organization to 
meet new strategic challenges. 
One policy initiative addressing the need for transformation innovations is the COE concept. 
This concept consists of 16 unique multilaterally funded centers (4 in the process of 
accreditation) that train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO member and partner 
countries2, assist in doctrine development, identify lessons learned3, improve interoperability 
and capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation. These centers are 
meant to offer recognized expertise and experience aimed to benefit the Alliance and support 
the transformation of NATO, while avoiding the duplication of assets, resources and 
capabilities already present within the NATO command structure. 4 
Coordinated by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia in the United 
States, COEs are considered to be international military organizations. Although the concept 
is not an entity of the NATO command structure, it constitutes a wider framework supporting 
NATO command structures (NCS). Designed to complement the Alliance’s current resources, 
COEs cover a wide variety of areas, with each one focusing on a specific field of expertise to 
enhance NATO capabilities5. This means that the concept and the centers inherently enjoy an 
autonomy that makes the concept suitable for further study. This point will be properly 
elaborated later in the thesis. 
                                                
1 Coined by US Senator Richard Lugar on whether NATO should depart from its traditional 
mission of territorial defense, which it later did in operations in the Balkans and then to 
Afghanistan. 
2 With notable exceptions of one COE (Cold Weather operations), that is nationally funded 
(meaning no sponsoring states). 
3 Lessons Learned is a term often employed by military forces and doctrinal commands in 
which systematic evaluations are used for training, research and development in order to learn 
from former operational experiences. 
4 The respective centers are from now on referred to COEs (in plural), whereas the 
organizational concept is referred to the COE concept. See more on the difference in the 
chapter three. To avoid any initial confusion, the unit of analysis in this thesis is the COE 
concept. 
5 Retrieved from NATO’s official COE topic pages 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68372.htm  
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This thesis is about understanding the rationale and the tensions that lie within the COE 
concept, and how it can be understood in relation to NATO transformation. It employs an 
institutionalist approach to map different institutional logics of what is perceived as 
appropriate by key personnel within and affiliated with the concept, and seeks to analyze the 
concept’s roles and rationale, especially in light of transformation of NATO. 
1.1 Research Questions 
The thesis is organized around two main parts respectively stem from two research questions. 
The first part is a mapping of the institutional logics that dominate the COE concept, and the 
second part is an analysis of what roles the COE concept plays, and its strategic intentions, 
relevance and importance6. The two questions are related in the sense that the second uses the 
findings from question one to assess the concept´s rationale, which is used to answer the 
second research question. The questions are elaborated in the following sections. 
Question 1: Identifying institutional logics  
There are many studies and analyses on NATO transformation7, but in-depth analyses on 
actual consequences and results of NATO transformation are more rare. NATO Response 
Force (NRF) is the notable exception that seems to have received significant scholarly 
attention8. Besides this, there seems to be few studies that seek to understand the mechanisms 
and dynamics of transformational outcomes. In particular, there are no academic analyses on 
the COE concept at all, or on any of the respective centers within the concept, which means 
that there are no significant contributions that promote an organized understanding of the 
COE concept. (Bialos and Koehl 2005) 
As a result, the first part of the research aim is mainly to offer a mapping of the institutional 
logics and its norms and values that are perceived appropriate on the concept´s sources of 
power, its meaning, and its consequences. This is done in an attempt to identify characteristics 
                                                
6 Institutional logics are based on the theory of logic of appropriateness, emphasizing that 
individuals and organizations fulfill identities by following rules and procedures that they 
imagine as appropriate to the situations they are facing. The approach is elaborated in 
chapter two. 
7 For a selection of these studies and analyses, see Binnendijk & Kugler (2003), Heier (2003), 
Hamilton (2004), and Gordon (1997)   
8 See in particular Bialos and Koehl (2005) 
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of the concept and the tensions within. Given the concept’s autonomy, it is fair to expect some 
competing institutional logics in which different belief systems compete over how to organize 
and achieve the full potential of the COE concept. The research question is as follows: 
Which institutional logics can be identified in regard to how NATO Centers of Excellence are 
organized? 
By using interviews, the empirical evidence is sought to be classified in four institutional 
logics, organized in the pairs logic of defense sovereignty vs. logic of defense solidarity (level 
of integration), and logic of defense exclusiveness and level of defense pluralism (level of 
openness).  
Question 2: COE and its role in NATO transformation 
The second part of the research focus seeks to place the concept of COE within the broader 
field of defense transformation in NATO. To answer this part of the thesis, an understanding 
of the transformation is needed, an understanding that is provided in the final part of this 
chapter, and then further elaborated throughout the thesis. The first element in the second 
research question will assess the role of the COE concept in NATO transformation. 
Furthermore, the conclusions from the institutional logics analyzed in research question one 
will then be used as a foundation for the concept´s rationale, understood as the set of reasons 
or a logical basis for a course of action or belief. This rationale and key features of the 
concept will in the final part of the research question be analyzed to assess a potential match 
with the NATO transformation strategic guidelines 1) national commitments, 2) role 
specialization, 3) pooling military capabilities, 4) interoperability, and 5) cost-effectiveness, 
thus enabling us to assess the concept´s strategic intention, relevance and importance in 
regard to NATO transformation. The overall research question is: (Adler 2008) 
2) What role(s) do(es) the COE concept play in the field of defense transformation in NATO, 
and what is the concept’s strategic intention, relevance and importance?  
1.2 Central Terms and Concepts 
With a topic that intersects political science and military studies, there is an evident need to 
clarify some expressions and concepts in order to make this thesis’ arguments accessible for 
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all audiences. This section will therefore present a clearer understanding of the terms 
transformation and doctrine. 
Understanding Transformation 
Defense transformation is a term that can be classified as an essentially contested concept, 
because it is a “concept the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about 
their proper uses on the part of their users” (Gallie 1956). The term has long been 
synonymous with “Revolutions of Military Affairs” (RMA), putting military technology and 
weapons systems at the heart of what was understood as military transformation (Petersson 
2011, pp. 101-131). The term was however, reintroduced and branded by the George W. Bush 
(junior) administration to describe a full-scale reorganization of US defense policy and 
priorities that the Administration perceived to be the biggest threats in the 21st century. Since 
this, the term has not only highlighted in US Presidential speeches on national security issues, 
but also been a key element in US, allied and NATO defense policies and strategic concepts 
(Hamilton 2004, pp. 3-24, Sloan 2008, pp. 38-51). Lately, Hamilton argues that the term has 
lost much of its original focus in the United States, using it to describe everything from 
reorganization of the US federal government to reorientation of foreign policy priorities, 
implying that commentators often equate “transformation” with “change”. One of the most 
notable scholars on military transformation, Hans Binnendijk (US National Defense 
University), therefore describes transformation as “the process of creating and harnessing a 
revolution in military affairs”, a definition that includes new capabilities harnessed to new 
doctrine and new approaches to organization, training, business practice and even culture 
(Binnendijk 2002), and that covers the notion that transformation is a timeless phenomenon. 
In NATO, there is no single "NATO Transformation Agenda". Robert G. Bell argues that it 
can be said that there are three, each began for different reasons at different times, but all are 
now overlapping and interrelated. The Prague Agenda, initiated by former Secretary General 
Lord George Robertson in 2002 in response to the "lessons of Kosovo and 9/11", focuses on 
changes in capabilities, missions and structures. The second is the Norfolk Agenda, initiated 
by former Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in 2004 is a response to the "lessons of 
Afghanistan", and focuses on changes in defense planning, force generation and common 
funding. The final “transformation” is the Munich Agenda, initiated by German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder in 2005 in response to the "lessons of the Iraq crisis", and focuses on 
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changes in NATO's role (or lack thereof) as a venue for genuine transatlantic strategic 
consultation and decision-making (Bell 2005).  
This thesis focuses on NATO transformation as developing capabilities, enhancing missions 
and reorganizing structures (the Prague Agenda), with a special emphasis on capabilities and 
structures.  This perspective does not solely focus on RMA as an explanation for 
transformation, but that transformation rather is characterized from ongoing changes in 
technology, organizational changes, and in new broad approaches to conflict based on the 
changing strategic environment accompanying the end of the Cold War.  
Explaining Doctrine 
Doctrine is a central element since it is at fundamental for the COE concept´s mission and 
purpose, and can be said to be at the very heart of transformation since “doctrine is to 
planners of military forces what blueprints are to architects”. In a review on military doctrine, 
retired US colonel Harry G. Summers (1992) explains that doctrine is a key determinant of 
defense planning, especially the planning of future force structure. Understanding the concept 
of doctrine is therefore important to understand what exactly the COE concept is all about. 
In the Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01-D)9, doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by 
which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.  It is authoritative, but 
requires judgment in application”. The principal purpose of doctrine is to provide any Armed 
Forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations, and is about how those 
operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. A 
doctrine is meant to be dynamic and constantly reviewed for relevance; it describes how a 
force operates, but not why they do what they do, which is the realm of policy.  
The purpose of doctrines varies from outlining overarching principles to describing 
procedures and tactical or technical standardization issues applicable to the lowest levels. 
Especially the former has NCS as target audience, and is known as capstone or keystone 
publications. Because of their scope and close relation with policy documents, the 
development and approval of military doctrine often requires consensus for implementation 
and execution at the appropriate NATO military command level to ensure that consistency 
                                                
9 The publication is available at http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/c45d7ae8-ed47-40d3-8018-
767da039c26a/0/ajp01d.pdf [accessed March 25th 2012] 
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with policy is safeguarded. Understanding doctrine is therefore an important element in 
understanding the COE concept, whose main purpose is to assist in doctrine development. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter two (Theoretical Framework) will present the thesis’ theoretical foundation. By first 
introducing the neo-institutionalist approach, an account for a particular sociological view of 
analyzing institutions is given, namely through institutional logics and “logics of 
appropriateness”. With this in mind, the second part comprises of a discussion of a specific 
analytical framework developed by Jozef Bátora in his study on the European Defense 
Agency (EDA) and its competing institutional logics. The principles for his configuration of 
an analytical framework for EDA are finally utilized to construct an adjusted analytical 
framework for studying institutional logics within the COE concept. 
Chapter three (Methodological Framework) presents the method of procedure for analyzing 
the concept, primarily by discussing case selection, choice of specific methods for collecting 
empirical data, and assessing the validity and reliability of these methods and the study as 
such. 
The following, chapter four (Closing the Capabilities Gap), gives a more extensive backdrop 
for NATO transformation as known today, discussing the central events and documents that 
are and have been central for transformational efforts in NATO. Especially three summits and 
belonging documents and concepts are discussed in detail, namely the Washington Summit 
1999 (Defense Capabilities Initiative), the Prague Summit 2002 (Prague Capabilities 
Commitments), and the upcoming Chicago Summit May 2012 (Smart defense concept). A 
background for the key features and characteristics for the COE concept and an overview of 
the various COEs is then offered at the end of the chapter. 
The most extensive chapter of analysis (chapter five) is reflected by the two research 
questions, and firstly consists of matching the empirical data with the four institutional logics 
in my analytical framework. The chapter continues in assessing the COE concept and its role 
in NATO transformation, assesses whether the concepts plays an identifying, supporting 
or/and executing role in NATO transformation. By using the findings from research question 
one, it goes on discussin the concept’s strategic intention, relevance and importance in regard 
to NATO transformation guidelines. The analysis is then wrapped up by presenting the 
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concept’s rationale and role in NATO transformation, based on the findings, analyses, and 
discussions throughout the thesis. 
The last chapter six will finally offer the thesis’ concluding remarks, including key theoretical 
and practical (policy) implications that could and should be looked into in the future. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter will first offer a short account of the basic principles and assumptions of new 
institutionalism, before it explains how institutional logics can be understood. Further, it will 
review an analysis of EDA’s colliding institutional logics by Jozef Bátora (2009), and explain 
how it has laid the foundation for my own conceptual framework, which is presented in the 
final section of this chapter. 
Judging what is “right” or “rational” behavior is often unclear and ambiguous due to the 
autonomy of the COE concept, thus making everything potentially justified as “correct 
behavior” depending on who you ask. Therefore, instead of focusing on the formal 
agreements of the COE concept, a new institutional approach is employed to identify the 
logics and perceptions that dominate within the concept, and thus trying to determine the 
rationale on “what COEs should do, and how to do it”. This includes both how things actually 
are being done and/or how they should be. 
Organized in four institutional logics paired together in opposing logics, this theoretical 
framework emphasize that individuals and organizations fulfill or enact identities by 
following rules and procedures that they imagine as appropriate to the situations that they are 
facing (Christensen and Røvik 1999, March and Olsen 1989). 
Unlike more common international relations positivist theories like realism and 
(neo)liberalism, new institutional theory seeks to open “the black box” by emphasizing the 
role of institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an 
organization, social order, or society (March and Olsen 2005, p. 948). More specifically, the 
thesis’ framework will assess potential institutional logics within the concept. The ambition of 
employing an institutionalist approach is creating a basis for an analytical framework that can 
make us better understand the very rationale of the concept, and to identify the dominant 
logics within the concept that might shape and affect decision-making within COEs. These 
logics are in other words the foundation for understanding the concept´s rationale, which is 
employed to answer research question two. 
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2.1 Using a New Institutionalist Perspective 
The growing use of the term “new institutionalism” in political science has led to a confusion 
about what it is, how it differs from other approaches, and how to classify the specific schools 
that categorize under new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, pp. 936-957). The new 
institutionalism perspective used in this thesis is founded on the works of James March and 
Johan O. Olsen (1984, 1989, 1995, 2002, 2005), in which they argue that political life is not 
solely organized around policy making, aggregation of predetermined preferences and 
resources, and finally regulation of behavior and outcomes through external incentives and 
constraints. Rather, it holds that politics involves a search for collective purpose, direction, 
meaning and belonging, and that it in contrast with standard equilibrium models holds that 
history is inefficient because it assumes that institutions reach a unique organizational form 
conditional on current functional and normative circumstances, and thus independent of their 
historical path (Olsen 2007b). 
Since I employ new institutionalism in this thesis, the “old” one also deserves some words 
before going in-depth on what new institutionalism is. In the old institutionalism, issues of 
influence, coalitions, and competing values were central, along with power and informal 
structures (Clark 1994, Clark 1972, Selznick 1949, Selznick 1957). The new institutionalism 
on the other hand, has its emphasis on legitimacy, the embeddedness of organizational fields, 
and the centrality of classification, and schema (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, Greenwood and Hinings 1996, p. 1022). It also goes further and tries to 
determine if any assumed differences exist, and if so in what ways those alternative ways of 
organizing political life differ, and what difference this makes for the performance of political 
systems (Peters 2005, Weaver and Rockman 1993, Von Mettenheim 1996), with a particular 
focus on sanctions and change that alternative sources of legitimacy lead to. 
In an article by Hall and Taylor, (1996, pp. 936-937) the authors distinguish between three 
different analytical approaches where all of them call themselves “new institutionalism”. 
These three schools of thought are labeled historical institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Despite all of them are trying to explain the 
role that institutions play in the determination of political outcomes, they offer different foci 
on how to construe the relationship between institutions and behavior and how to explain the 
process whereby institutions originate and change.  
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The historical perspective focuses on how previous choices affect the prospects for 
subsequent policy outcomes, where the past plays an important role in shaping and 
constraining actors at a later time (Pierson 2004). Rational choice institutionalism on the other 
hand has a more functional point of view, and offers a calculus approach in which the basic 
assumption is that individuals adhere to calculated patterns of behavior (logic of 
consequences). Deviation will in this perspective assumed to make the individual worse off 
than will adherence, thus making that the more an institution contributes to the resolution of 
collective action dilemmas or the more gains from exchange it makes possible, the more 
robust it will be (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 940). The final approach is the sociological 
institutionalism that arose primarily within the subfield of organization theory, coined 
normative institutionalism by Peters (2005, p. 19). This school of institutionalism is the stark 
contrast to the school of rational choice institutionalism, in the sense that sociological 
institutionalism is guided by norms and values, rather than rules and incentives (rational 
choice) or history (historical institutionalism). This thesis will continue on focusing on 
institutional logics, which is a central theme in the school of sociological institutionalism. 
2.1.1 Institutional Logics 
The specific sociological institutionalist approach used in this thesis places a strong emphasis 
on norms and values of institutions as a means of understanding how they function and how 
they determine individual behavior (Peters 2005, p. 19). One of the broad types of logics of 
action in formal organizations is the logic of appropriateness, defined by March ((1994, p. 
57) by emphasizing that individuals and organizations fulfill identities by following rules and 
procedures that they imagine as appropriate to the situations they are facing. It argues that 
institutions generate and implement prescriptions that define how the “game” has to be 
played: who is legitimate to participate, what are the acceptable agendas, which sanctions to 
apply in case of deviations as well as the process by which changes should occur (Thoenig 
2003). This approach constitutes the sociological branch of March and Olsen’s school of new 
institutionalism, namely that institutions are influenced by what its participants perceive as 
appropriate. These logics of appropriateness serve as perspectives on human action and means 
to act according to the institutionalized practices of a collectively and mutual understanding 
of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good (Olsen 2007b, p. 3).  
12 
 
March and Olsen emphasize a view based on a logic of appropriateness but see history as 
inefficient, and which is an approach that effectively is used to understand the dynamics and 
mechanisms within the COE concept. In this perspective, the rules, norms, institutions, and 
identities that drive human action are seen as developing in a way that cannot be predicted 
from prior environmental conditions (March and Olsen 2005, p. 958), but rather coevolve in 
the worlds in which they act and engage in. Olsen continues by noting that actors “may 
struggle with how to classify themselves and others -who they are, and what they are- and 
what the classifications imply in a specific situation”.  
The approach stresses individual identities that through a process of individualization and 
socialization, an actor voluntary chooses self-imposed and –selected roles and rules and 
where obligations, responsibilities and commitment are learned and followed, not chosen 
(Christensen and Røvik 1999, pp. 326-327). This, institutional identities are based on the 
development of individual identities, and thereby creating similar attitudes, norms and values, 
and thus important for defining attitudes and activities (Selznick 1957). It is rules that define 
attitudes and activities, and both formal and informal rules apply in the theory of logic of 
appropriateness. These rules become relevant according to the different situations (March 
1994, pp. 63, 68, Christensen and Røvik 1999, p. 326). 
The approach also implies that actors have multiple identities or a repertoire of identities 
therefore also multiple rule options in different situations, and can be particularly challenging 
when several institutions structured according to different principles and rules prove 
competing analyses and behavioral logics for the same area of action (Olsen 2007b, p. 6). 
This applies for the case of the COE concept, in which its autonomous role to organize itself 
can prescribe different identities, and thus institutional logics. The approach is therefore 
chosen in an attempt to create some expected institutional logics, and thus identifying which 
identities and rules that seems appropriate within the COE concept. This is a challenging task 
since identities and logics, as Christensen and Røvik (1999, pp. 329-331) argues, are often 
complex, competing or ambiguous. This is one of the weaknesses of the theory, since it does 
not describe how to deal with these potential ambiguities and complexities. Nevertheless, by 
using the approach and the assumptions and variables that follow, a conceptual framework 
can be constructed for analyzing the COE concept by identifying the rules and identities 
through institutional logics. This will as a result further the understanding of the concept´s 
rationale, and better enable us to answer research question two. 
13 
 
2.2 Towards a Conceptual Framework for 
Understanding the COE Concept 
The principles for one specific configuration for understanding EDA are utilized to construct 
an adjusted analytical framework for studying institutional logics within the COE concept. In 
this respect, there are arguably some diverging logics concerning basic notions of what level 
of integration in the defense sector is appropriate for NATO, what coordination mechanisms 
that should apply, and who should participate in what initiatives; the same institutional 
dynamics that have been found in the case of EDA (see Bátora 2009, Keohane 2004, Keohane 
and Valasek 2008, Witney 2008).  
Bátora’s framework and analysis of EDA in the article “European Defense Agency: A 
Flashpoint of Institutional Logics” (2009) is specifically of interest to this study of COE 
concept, because the two organizational entities can be said to be caught in a crossfire of 
interests and appropriate levels of integration and openness. In his article, Bátora investigates 
what kind of defense integration in the EU that is appropriate, by using EDA as a case. The 
agency, which has been one of the key elements in efforts to bring about more coherence and 
integration in defense cooperation among the union’s member states, has been working in a 
policy environment featuring competing visions of appropriate institutional arrangements – or 
institutional logics – in regard to the political order of European Union (EU) defense. Bátora 
therefore argues that by mapping out the colliding logics and discussing how they have been 
playing out in EDA, the findings and discussions can be helpful in identifying an emerging 
political order of EU defense.  
Using Bátora’s framework is useful because it is a fruitful framework for identifying different 
logics, and hence understanding what kind of integration (if any) the COE concept is all 
about. Assuming that the concept share the same key elements as EDA concerning coherence 
and integration in defense cooperation among NATO’s member states, a similar framework of 
competing institutional logics could also prove to helpful in identifying developments within 
NATO transformation. Secondly, identifying institutional logics within the COE concept 
would be helpful in answering the second research question of this thesis, namely assessing 
whether the institutional logics are coherent with the strategic logic that is guiding NATO 
transformation. 
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A key question that applies for EDA as it does with the COE concept is how and what 
loyalties one can map within the two concepts, and what level of integration they represent. 
As Bátora points out, integration in the field of political analysis evolves around three 
dimensions: a) the level of integration of a community including the principles for 
interactions within it; b) the notion of who are legitimate participants in a particular sphere of 
political life or political community; and c) notions of what coordination mechanisms and 
instruments are to be applied (Olsen 2007a, pp. 19-27, Bátora 2009). By constructing four 
pairs of competing logics that address these dimensions, he thus manages to place EDA 
within these pairs to classify and understand the agency. 
The first dimension that Bátora folds out is the level of integration of a community, including 
the principles for interactions within it. Bátora operationalizes the dimension by investigating 
the principles that govern the relationships between EDA and its institutional surroundings. 
The second dimension focuses on the participants, in other words which actors that EDA 
works for and with, for example allies, partnership countries, industry, research and 
development, other institutions and actors. The third and final dimension looks more 
specifically at coordination mechanisms, and can be explored by a focus on actual 
organizational arrangements and rules regulating interactions within the policy field in which 
EDA operates.  
 
Figure 1 Source: Bátora’s conceptual framework for assessing EDA (2009) 
Bátora uses these three dimensions to identify the following 8 (4 competing pairs) logics 
(figure 1), and is helpful in constructing a conceptual framework that can be applied for the 
COE concept. Although his framework lays the foundation from my analytical design, the 
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logics in this thesis will not organize under the three dimensions as Bátora does. Instead, the 
dimensions are used to identify relevant empirical indicators that constitute the conceptual 
framework of four logics.  
The remains of this chapter will present these four institutional logics and their respective 
empirical expectations that are adjusted to this thesis´ concept. The institutional logics are 
finally summarized in Table 1 at the end of this chapter, and sought to constitute the concept´s 
rationale. 
2.2.1 Constructing Institutional Logics for COEs 
Specifying and discussing how these institutional logics within the COE concept are to be 
used and analyzed, is important. The four institutional logics are meant as Weberian ideal 
types, used to stress certain elements common to most cases of a given phenomenon. Ideal 
types do not refer to “perfect types”, but rather as idea-constructs that help put a socially 
unorganized reality into a system of order of understanding. Institutional logics constitute the 
four “ideal types”, and are a way of categorizing broad belief systems that arguably shape 
cognition and behavior of actors. Given the lack of studies on the COE concept, the logics 
will be used for a mapping that will contribute to a more structured understanding of this 
particular phenomenon, which consequently will constitute the concept´s rationale, which is 
further used as a basis to answer the second research question. 
The four logics are organized in two pairs, where two and two are contrasting each other. The 
logics are nevertheless not mutually exclusive in the sense that picking one does not 
necessarily mean excluding the other. Rather, the opposing pairs of logics will be used to 
understand the dynamics and nuances of the concept. This means that there are no 
expectations that there is a right and wrong logic, but that the findings will help to organize 
the empirical findings to understand the concept´s features and characteristics, and that the 
concept is not exclusively in one or two particular logics. 
The first and most obvious organizational feature that is expected to trigger competing 
institutional logics is that the concept’s autonomy from both national military (or civilian) 
command structures as well as the NCS. Had the concept been organized and funded by state 
command structures, the expectation would be that state interest and sovereignty would be at 
the center of the concept’s rationale and perceived meaning. Had the concept been organized 
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and funded by NCS however, one could expect the opposite, namely that NATO (shared) 
interests and solidarity would be at the very heart of the concept. Having neither of these 
configurations for COE, but instead a solution in the middle where COEs are operated by 
clusters of states, the rationale for running and maintaining these centers become all the more 
interesting to study since they seem to be stuck in the middle of a logic of defense sovereignty 
and a logic of defense solidarity (level of integration). The notion that the COE concept is 
arguably caught in the crossfire between these two is further evident that NATO (mainly 
through ACT) seems to have a significant role in accrediting and coordinating COE efforts. 
These elements of regulation from NATO is in stark contrast to an opposing feature of the 
concept, namely that a framework state and eventual supporting states are supposed to pay for 
each center, provide the necessary resources and fill positions with their personnel. Can the 
empirical evidence prove in what direction loyalty is directed? 
The other organizational feature of COEs is the fact that the centers are encouraged to 
establish relationships with non-NATO states and other external entities (international 
organizations, industry, private companies, schools, universities, research institutes, etc). The 
answer to how much or how many partners the respective COEs that is appropriate, and how 
formalized this cooperation should be, is nevertheless an open question that is up to each 
center. Considering the open-ended position that the concept has in regard to relationships, it 
is somewhere between a logic of defense exclusiveness and a logic of defense pluralism (level 
of openness). The former logic implies that COEs, although encouraged, include none/few 
external entities and states, meaning that “COE is for and by NATO”, whereas the latter 
indicate the opposite, in which it is perceived natural to include non-NATO states and other 
external entities. 
In terms of the institutional logics´ theoretical foundation, the logics on sovereignty (logic 1) 
and exclusiveness (logic 3) are theoretically founded in a hundred year old founding thought 
within political science and political sociology formulated by Max Weber, that the state as an 
institution can be defined as a monopoly of legitimate use of force (Weber 1965). This 
monopoly is the key characteristic of the modern state, and requires clear territorial 
boundaries for sovereignty, and consequently exclusive control on everything within it. This 
laid the foundation for the modern armed forces, which amongst other has the characteristics 
that it was completely led from the state, and that the military was distinguished and separated 
from the civil society (Matlary and Østerud 2005, pp. 11-32). Having this in mind, the 
17 
 
theoretical foundation for these logics is that the concept´s logics first of all is defined by 
national interest and the exclusive prerogative of the state, and that the ideal defense integrity 
is achieved through military self-sufficiency and self-reliance (logic 1). For logic 3 the 
theoretical foundation is simply that COE is for and by NATO, thus stressing clear boundaries 
for whom to include. 
The two other logics on solidarity and pluralism (logic 2 and 4) however, are theoretically 
founded in a new theoretical strand that finds that elements of security and armed forces are 
increasingly being internationalized and privatized. The reasons for this as Østerud and 
Matlary argue, are changed patterns of risk and threat, and a shift in the technological and 
economic context (ibid). Moskos, Williams and Segal (2000) concludes that the traditional 
armed forces have developed into “a post-modern military”, amongst others represented 
through organizational change like tighter links between military and civilian spheres, and a 
multinational integration of military and through international military organizations. Having 
this in mind, the theoretical foundation for logic 2 and 4 is that COE’s logic is defined by 
strong relations to NATO and that COE as a common endeavor among states, achieve 
security through sharing of military resources and mutual reliance (logic 2), and that COE is 
an arena for all relevant actors (logic 4). 
The following sections will now elaborate on the four logics, organized in pairs of defense 
sovereignty vs. defense solidarity and defense exclusiveness vs. defense pluralism. The four 
logics are numbered 1-4, with indicators organized and numbered under each respective logic 
(i.e., 1.1, 1.2). A complete summary of all logics and indicators are found at the end of this 
chapter.  
Defense sovereignty (logic 1) vs. defense solidarity (logic 2) 
Concerning the logic of defense sovereignty and logic of defense solidarity, a set of empirical 
assumptions will serve as indicators for this particular case study. In the logic of defense 
sovereignty, the empirical expectations are 1.1) a primacy of state interests in governing COE, 
1.2) a governing body and principles played out by officers/eq that act on behalf of their state 
interests, and 1.3) requests for support (RFS) from NATO are given less priority. On the other 
hand, a logic of defence solidarity consequently leads us to assume 2.1) primacy of NATO 
needs and interests in running COE, 2.2) subject matter experts that constitute governing body 
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and principles in which military (operational) professional needs are the top priority, and 2.3) 
requests for support from NATO are given high priority. 
First of all, a logic of sovereignty would imply that COE as a concept and the specific centers 
in general would be fully operated by the framework and supporting state. This means that the 
centers would have a “bottom-up” approach to its governing structures with a primacy of state 
negotiations, and thus enjoy a high degree of autonomy from NCS. In terms of the logic of 
solidarity on the other hand, the empirical evidence will support the opposite; COE would 
then be strongly influenced by NCS, and thus have strong elements of supranational 
regulation and steering. As opposed to the former logic, COE would hence have a low degree 
of autonomy in regard to NCS.  
Secondly, the empirical expectations in the logic of sovereignty would therefore be a primacy 
of state interests in governing COE, and a governing body and principles played out by 
officers/eq. that act on behalf of their state interests. In the other logic, namely supranational 
regulation, the empirical will show a primacy of NATO needs and interests in the running of 
COE, with subject matter experts and NATO interests that dominate the program of work on 
what the respective COEs should work on. 
The last empirical expectations are related to what is called RFS and to the “jointness” of 
defense research and development programs. RSF are specific needs that NATO ACT wants a 
specific COE to produce for NATO. In this respect, they function as “orders” that they want 
COE to produce. In regard to the two logics, the expectations are that the logic of sovereignty 
implies that these requests for RFS are not given priority when and if state interests have a 
higher priority, whilst the opposing logic implies that RFS are given high priority, regardless 
of state interest. 
Defense exclusiveness (logic 3) vs. defense pluralism (logic 4) 
Also in regard to the logic of defense exclusiveness and logic of defense pluralism, a set of 
expected empirical assumptions that would serve as indicators will be presented. For the logic 
of defense exclusiveness, these are 3.1) no room for strategic partnerships with states or 
international organizations beyond NATO, 3.2) little to none civil-military cooperation with 
other external entities (industry, private companies, schools, universities, research institutes, 
etc.), and 3.3) exclusive information sharing. In the opposing logic, expectations are 4.1) 
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strategic partnerships with states or international organizations are highly esteemed, 4.2) high 
degree of civil-military cooperation with other external entities, and 4.3) effectiveness and 
willingness of information sharing. 
The first indicator has to do with appropriate extent COEs cooperate through strategic 
partnerships with other states than NATO members, and other international organizations. A 
strategic partnership is understood as a formalized cooperation between a COE and the 
partner, and can materialize in form of a the partner becoming a supporting state in a COE, 
that a COE and the partner works together on a specific project, or simply that the partner is 
given access to seminars, courses, etc. that are offered at a COE. The most obvious example 
of an international organization would be the European Union, and is specifically mentioned 
in the chapter on analysis. In the opposing logic, the difference between defense 
exclusiveness and pluralism is obvious; there is no room for partners in the logic of 
exclusiveness, whereas it is highly esteemed in the opposing logic. One important 
encouragement stated in the founding NATO Military Committee (MC) document for the 
COE concept states that  
“[r]elationships between COE and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Nations (including 
Russia and Ukraine) and Mediterranean Dialogue countries are encouraged. In the context of 
the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP), a COE should make use of 
ongoing developments, in particular in the Training Education Enhancement Program 
(TEEP), which includes PfP Advanced Distributed Learning and Simulation and co-operation 
with PfP Training Centres.” (NATO 2003) 10 
The question however, is what level and intensity of partnerships that are perceived as 
appropriate within the COE concept.  
The second indicator is concerned with the degree of civil-military cooperation within the 
COE concept. This cooperation is limited to actors in industry, private companies, schools, 
universities, research institutes, etc. The diversity of actors that can organize under an 
eventual civil-military cooperation is high, meaning that it is demanding to define what (or 
who) cooperation that is appropriate. In this thesis, all mentioning of the actors mentioned 
                                                
10 The MC-document is NATO Unclassified (not releasable to the public), but the concept is 
thoroughly discussed in an open presentation by ACT Transformation Network Branch 
(TNB), available at 
https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/COE/ENSEC/MOU1/MOUConfere/ACTBriefs/IntrotoCOE 
[accessed March 26th 2012]. The actual MC-document was also publicly available on the 
Internet for a long while, but was later removed.  
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above will classify as civil-military cooperation, given that the cooperation is somewhat 
organized and/or formalized. As with the former indicator, civil-military cooperation would 
be inappropriate according to a logic of exclusiveness, as opposed to a logic of pluralism 
where civil-military cooperation would indeed be highly esteemed. 
The third and final indicator deals with the effectiveness and willingness of information 
sharing within and beyond the concept of COE, and this aspect looks at the dispersion of 
information between different actors that are involved in the COE concept. The indicator must 
be assessed in two respects, first how COE products (like assessments, reports, papers, etc.) 
are shared within NATO, and second the degree of information sharing between respective 
COE involved states and strategic or civil-military partner (see the two former indicators). 
The first respect looks at whether COE outcomes are openly published and shared with other 
NATO members that are not formally or financially supporting a given COE. If the COE 
product is perceived as exclusive and only shared between the framework and supporting 
states, this would be consistent with a logic of exclusiveness, and the other way around if it is 
perceived as natural for a COE to share its products to the Alliance as whole, including its 
respective members. Second, this indicator can also be measured on the flow of information 
between NATO-members that support a COE and non-NATO partners of that specific COE. 
In this case, information would be perceived as important to share beyond NATO members in 
the logic of defense pluralism, and the opposite for a logic of defense exclusiveness. 
2.2.2 Mapping Competing Logics Within the COE Concept 
Table 1 summarizes the four competing logics that will be used in analyzing NATO COEs. It 
shows what theoretical foundation that lies behind each of the four logics, and more 
importantly states the indicators that will be used in the actual analysis of COE in chapter 
five. It is again important to stress that sovereignty vs. solidarity and exclusiveness vs. 
pluralism are not dichotomies, meaning that the pairs are not jointly exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive. Instead they are used as constructs, in order to summarize observations about 
things that cannot be observed directly, and thus helping us to organize and better understand 
the empirical evidence of the COE concept. 
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Table 1: A conceptual framework for NATO Centers of Excellence  
Institutional logic Theoretical foundation Empirical expectations 
Logic of defense sovereignty 
  
-COE’s logic defined by national 
interest 
-COE as an exclusive prerogative of the 
state, defense integrity achieved through 
military self-sufficiency and self-
reliance  
1.1 primacy of state interests in 
governing COE 
1.2 a governing body and principles 
played out by officers/eq. that act on 
behalf of their state interests 
1.3 RFS are given less priority 
 
 VS.  
Logic of defense solidarity  -COE’s logic is defined by strong 
relations to NATO 
- COE as a common endeavor among 
states, security achieved through sharing 
of military resources and mutual 
reliance 
2.1 primacy of NATO needs and 
interests in governing COE 
2.2 subject matter experts constitute 
governing body and principles in which 
military professional needs is of top 
priority 
2.3 RFS are of high priority 
 
 
-and- 
 
Logic of defense exclusiveness COE for and by NATO 3.1 no room for strategic partnerships 
with states or international organizations 
beyond NATO 
3.2 little to none civil-military 
cooperation with other external entities 
(industry, private companies, schools, 
universities, research institutes, etc.) 
3.3 restrictive and unwilling information 
sharing 
 
 VS.  
Logic of defense pluralism COE an arena for all relevant actors  4.1 Strategic partnerships with states or 
international organizations beyond 
NATO are highly esteemed 
4.2 High degree of civil-military 
cooperation with other external entities 
(industry, private companies, schools, 
universities, research institutes, etc.) 
4.3 Effective and willing information 
sharing 
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3 Methodological Framework 
The methodological framework consists of a case study strategy, in which I justify selecting 
the NATO Centers of Excellence concept in itself as the case. Furthermore, the chapter 
discusses how and why a qualitative approach is chosen, before it sums up the chapter by 
discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the methodological framework and study as such. 
3.1 Case Study Research as Strategy 
The overall theme of this thesis is transformation in NATO, which is a complex and vast field 
of study. In handling this scope and complexity, a case study research strategy is a natural 
choice because it seeks to explain a larger (but not indefinite) universe by analyzing certain 
units within it. This applies for this thesis, in which COE as a concept is chosen as a case 
study, and placed within the “bigger picture” of transformation. Robert K. Yin (1984, p. 23) 
defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence 
are used. The phenomenon that is at the heart of this study is obviously the concept of NATO 
Centers of Excellence, and why and how I treat this concept in this thesis is discussed in the 
following sections. 
3.1.1 Picking Centers of Excellence as Study Object 
NATO Centers of Excellence is an interesting study object for many reasons. First of all, 
since the specific COEs are not part of the NCS, the framework and supporting states 
basically have freedom to cooperate with whom they want, and at the level of integration and 
openness that is most helpful for the respective COE’s mission and goals. For example, if a 
COE considers cooperating with a PfP-country as advantageous for its center, there are no 
mechanisms that NATO could stop them from that. That implies, for example, that 
cooperation between EU and NATO is possible within the framework of COEs without any 
states blocking inter-institutional cooperation at political level (Quinlan 2007, pp. 63-68) 11. 
                                                
11 Particularly the Cyprus conflict has been an challenge for cooperation between EU and 
NATO, since Greence (in EU) and Turkey (in NATO) seem to block inter-institutional 
cooperation. 
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This freedom for COEs to organize themselves and include whomever they want in their 
organizations does not only include international institutions like the EU and other non-
NATO partners; the centers are also encouraged to include whatever research, development, 
academic institutions, etc. that a COE sees suitable. This autonomy is therefore one very 
important motivation for studying this concept. 
Secondly, the concept supposedly complies with Smart Defense principles of cost-effective 
and multilateral solutions12. COEs is a multilateral organizational form13, in which supporting 
states are expected to share costs, and contribute with necessary resources that will decrease 
duplication of assets and production in NATO, while at the same time increase effective use 
of resources. Mapping competing logics and tensions within this type of concept is therefore 
useful to understanding the rationale and dynamics of similar multilateral defense concepts. 
Thirdly, the COE network comprises of around 600 subject matter experts that are in the lead 
on their topics relevant to NATO. The ambition that these experts are sought to be used more 
effectively for NATO, but still organizing them outside the NCS, raises interesting policy 
implications as for how this could and should be done. 
Fourth and final, the COE concept serves as a potential arena for state interests in several 
ways. This fourth potential comprises of three concrete potentials for state interest. First of 
all, states arguably have “agenda-setting power” by hosting or supporting a COE, meaning 
that experts work on the topics that are important for the states that are represented in the 
steering committee. Secondly, although not in the battlefields, COE is also an actual 
contribution to the burden sharing within the Alliance; having a NATO-flag on national soil is 
still something that seems to be considered as valuable, perhaps especially in newer Alliance 
member states in particular. Thirdly, supporting states (or eventually states that send a liaison-
officer/eq.) can also promote their bilateral and military interests by supporting COEs. 
Bilateral in the sense that they can find out what is “going on” and report back home, and 
military in the sense that they have a point of contact to what is perhaps a world leading 
competence center for whatever field the respective COE is operating within.  
Indeed, the very concept of COE seems to be an innovation in regard to organizing military 
units, and seems to be a direct result of NATO transformational effort. This gives a practical 
                                                
12 See background for Smart Defense in section 4.1.3 
13 There is one notable exception: the Norwegian COE for Cold Weather Operations. This 
center has no formal supporting states, but does indeed have close ties with other states. 
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reason to pick the concept as study object, because this multilateral approach of organizing 
and developing military capabilities could say something about the practical dynamics and 
implications of the policy initiatives deriving from NATO transformational efforts. As 
Ulriksen argues, economic, political and military factors have given way for what he calls 
integration by default (decentralized military integration), in the sense that developments in 
NATO consists of a web of cooperative projects, each with its own dynamics and motivation, 
rather than a planned and controlled process above state level (Ulriksen 2007a). Examining 
COE as a part of this web and understanding how it operates is therefore ‘important for 
answering my two research questions.  
There are also important methodological aspects that make the COE concept “researchable”. 
The first one is that COE is a concept that seems more or less open to the public. This makes 
the concept and its founding documents and principles relatively easy to find. It is also a 
feature in NATO that both NATO ACT and involved states seems to be proud of – and it is 
hence not a problem getting in touch with people that want to share their information and 
perceptions regarding COEs. This might lead to an “eagerness” that could cause biased 
informants, but this is not perceived as a significant challenge. 
Last but not least, with its 16 different COEs (+ 4 waiting for accreditation) and their 
belonging subject matter areas, the concept is an exciting unit of analysis, but it nevertheless 
raises some methodological issues of defining and choosing units and cases in this study, 
something which the next section of this chapter will discuss. 
3.1.2 Selecting COE as Case 
Case studies in general allow a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to 
identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical aspects the researcher 
intends to measure (George and Bennett 2005, p. 19). This is indeed the case for studying the 
concept of COE – it allows in-depth analysis that secures the conceptual validity and secures 
the flexibility to identify and measure the indicators outlined in the former chapter. The unit 
of analysis is therefore the COE concept in itself. The concept is regulated through the MC-
document MCM-236-03 from December 2003 (NATO 2003), which defines it as a state or 
multinationally sponsored entity that offers recognized expertise and experience to the benefit 
of the Alliance, above all in support of transformation. It is also to provide opportunities to 
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enhance education and training, to improve interoperability and capabilities, to assist in 
doctrine development and/or to test and validate concepts through experimentation.  
There are 16 specific COEs (+ 4 waiting for accreditation) at the moment (April 2012), and 
each one has its own subject matter area. One could argue that selecting one or more specific 
COEs as unit of analysis could offer both a higher internal and external validity. Nevertheless, 
each center is fundamentally different in terms of personnel/state composition, subject matter, 
size, culture and specific outcome and focus. Studying some specific centers would therefore 
give a higher level of internal validity, but since it might not be comparable to other centers, 
or be fully indicative of COE as concept, it would be problematic in answering the research 
questions. Furthermore, understanding the concept as such is a constructive start to make a 
fertile ground for further research of its constituents. 
A specific COE is not part of the NATO command structure, but forms part of a wider 
framework that is supposed to support NCS. Hence, it is the COE as a concept that is the unit 
of analysis, limiting my study to the network of specific COEs and the supporting role of 
ACT.  
3.2 A Qualitative Approach 
Taken the theoretical framework into consideration, this study is a qualitative one with a case 
study approach. Gerring (2007, p. 20) defines a case study as “the intensive study of a single 
case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of 
cases (a population)”. This approach is by far the most fruitful way to go in order to gather 
empirical evidence that answer my research questions in a satisfactory manner, particularly to 
map the different institutional logics in regard to research question one, and assessing whether 
the findings, which are collected through interviews, can be related to NATO transformational 
efforts. 
3.2.1 Interviews 
I have primarily interviewed key personnel that have, or have had, a connection to the COE 
concept or NATO as such, including personnel that have a link to ACT, the NATO 
Headquarters (HQ) in Brussels, senior officials and state representatives in a selection of 
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COEs14. The people I’ve interviewed have primarily been selected through snowball 
sampling, which is a method for selection that is a special nonprobability method used when 
the desired sample characteristic (like affiliation, knowledge, or connection to the COE 
concept) is rare or hard to gain access to. It may be difficult or cost prohibitive to locate 
respondents in these situations, and sampling relies on referrals from initial subjects to 
generate additional subjects, and while this technique can dramatically lower search costs, it 
comes at the expense of introducing bias because the technique itself reduces the likelihood 
that the sample will represent a good cross section from the population (Biernacki and 
Waldorf 1981, pp. 141-163).  
In this respect, the method of sampling has led to majority of Norwegian officers/personnel. 
Nevertheless, unless the officers/personnel were asked about specific Norwegian points of 
view, they seemed to be wearing their “NATO flag” on their mental uniform. That meant that 
they always answered the questions as if they were talking about entire NATO or a specific 
center, rather than just from a Norwegian angle. That could reduce selection bias, but never 
entirely. This study therefore has to take into consideration a majority of Norwegian officers 
and personnel. 
Some data had to be collected online, in which the informants filled out a semi-structured 
questionnaire sent by e-mail that was in some cases followed up with an informal telephone 
interview. E-mail questionnaires are never optimal compared to personal interviews, but 
given the circumstances it was either questionnaires or nothing at all. Questionnaires were 
therefore chosen, well aware of the possible weaknesses that follow this solution for data 
collection. 
The personal interviews were all conducted in Oslo with a semi-structured interview guide15. 
Because of the informant’s diverse background and institutional affiliations, each guide was 
adapted to each person. Nevertheless, an illustrative guide for what topics that were addressed 
in all interviews is found in appendix B. 
The personal interviews were conducted in Norwegian, and the quotes in this thesis have 
therefore been translated to English. The e-mail questionnaires were both in English and 
                                                
14 A complete list over respondents is found in Appendix A 
15 Each guide was adjusted to each of the informants background and experiences, but an 
illustrative example is presented in Appendix B 
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Norwegian, depending on the informants’ nationality. The project has been approved by the 
Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services (Data Protection Official) with project number 
28668 for any further reference. 
3.2.2 Pattern Matching 
The concept of pattern matching means that an “expected pattern” will be used for 
specifications of the hypothesis that allow for a rigorous comparison with an “observed 
pattern” of values of variables in a test. The term “pattern identification” as a characteristic of 
qualitative analysis which Campbell defines as holistic (i.e., analyzing the pattern) rather than 
atomistic (i.e., analyzing its constituents) (Campbell 1966, Campbell 1975). Campbell argued 
that the single case study design could provide for a strong test of theory if an entire set of 
expectations deduced from that theory (which together would constitute an “expected 
pattern”) could be shown to be true in that case, an approach that he called 
“configurationally”. This is an approach that Yin discusses as the most desirable analytic 
strategy in case study research, and argues that for an independent variables design, one 
should formulate different expected patterns of independent variables, each based on a 
different and mutually exclusive theory and that the ambition of the study would be to 
determine which of the rival patterns has the largest overlap with the observed one (Hak and 
Dul 2009, Yin 1984).  
The institutional logics that were presented in the chapter presenting the theoretical 
framework for this thesis thus represent an expected pattern. The thesis uses the empirical 
evidence carried primarily through interviews as discussed in the former section to match 
observed data with the expected pattern, in which the results will be used to discuss whether 
the expected and observed patterns overlap, and what conclusions that can be drawn from 
this. 
3.3 Validity and Reliability of this Study 
Validity and reliability are two key criteria for quality in scholarly work, and it is therefore 
important to assess methodological strengths and weaknesses along the way. Validity is often 
divided in two parts; internal and external validity. While internal validity is concerned about 
making valid descriptive and causal inferences (Keohane et al. 1994, p. 236), external validity 
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is more concerned about generalization from the selection to a broader population, or other 
situations of times (Lund 2002, pp. 79-123). Reliability on the other hand, is whether the 
results are consistent over time or several measurements. The thesis’ scholarly quality will in 
this section be discussed according to these three elements in the following sections. 
Given the employed research strategy of a case study, the thesis achieves a high score of 
internal validity because the approach offers rich empirical evidence based on thick 
descriptions. The method of semi-structure interviewing furthermore gives the researcher the 
flexibility to go in-depth on the issues and topics that are important for the study. Assuming 
institutional logics and adjusting empirical expectations to my study, requires an evaluation of 
the measures that followed from the respective logics. This type of evaluation is called 
construct validity, also coined nomological validity. The underlying idea of construct/ 
nomological validity is that scores that can validly be claimed to measure a systematized 
concept, should fit well-established expectations that involve this concept (Adcock and 
Collier 2001, pp. 529-546). In regard to this type of validity, the empirical expectations seems 
to match the evidence well, and achieving construct validity was therefore not considered a 
challenge throughout the process of this thesis. Considering the substantial time used to 
prepare the data collection with both scholars and practitioners, construct validity is expected 
to be at a satisfactory level. 
The thesis´ external validity is not as strong as the internal validity. Since the study’s focus is 
on one case only, and not cross-case comparison, the study suffers problems of 
representativeness because it includes, by definition, only a small number of cases of some 
more general phenomenon (also referred to as the small-N problem) (Gerring 2007, p. 43). It 
is also essential that there is only one COE concept, and that the study thus studies “the whole 
population” of COE concepts – and thus not making it further subject to generalization. This 
does not automatically mean low external validity, as George & Bennett argue when coining 
contingent generalization (George and Bennett 2005, pp. 25-36). This means that this study’s 
conclusions can be generalized to a defined scope or domain, e.g. multilateral defense projects 
(e,g, specific Smart Defense projects)  or other similar international military organizations 
like the COE concept. 
In terms of reliability, all data collection was done according to qualitative principles, and 
most interviews were conducted personally, thus making the level of reliability discussable. 
Since my sources are open, they will probably provide the same points and perspectives if 
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they were asked again (test re-test principle). If another researcher would assess the empirical 
evidence, it could still lead to other conclusions due to differing subjective interpretations of 
the material (called inter-subjectivity). However, by reviewing the evidence, chances for this 
are perceived as small since the empirical evidence seems to be quite clear. One significant 
weakness to this study’s and the theory of logic of appropriateness´ reliability is however the 
temporal dimension. Since the findings are subject to the context, they cannot be expected to 
be the same if collected in another context. This means that if the same study were to be 
repeated in ten years from now, the results would therefore probably be quite different. This 
potential weakness is further discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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4 Closing the Capabilities Gap 
To understand the emerging need for transformation after the Cold War, and consequently the 
context of the COE concept, this chapter will offer a backdrop of some key NATO events and 
documents that have led to the developments in and around NATO that I address in this 
thesis. First of all it will first discuss NATO’s security context after the Cold War, and what 
challenges NATO faced after the supposed fall of the bipolar world order. I will then discuss 
how key documents like the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) forged at the Washington 
Summit 1999, and the follow-up Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) agreed upon at the 
Prague Summit 2002, have articulated the need for, and led the way to transformation and 
modernization in NATO, consequently leading to the establishment of COEs. Some words 
will also be devoted to the contemporary transformational challenges ahead of the Chicago 
Summit in 2012. 
The second part of this chapter will try to account for what COEs are in practice. It will 
present key facts and figures on how they are organized, what activities they offer, 
participating and/or funding states, and other features that can offer insights in this relatively 
new NATO concept.  
4.1 Ensuring Relevance Through Transformation 
NATO’s framework has changed drastically since the Cold War as it has tried to adjust itself 
to a new security context, and thereby new military challenges. In the wake of the end of the 
Cold War, NATO entered into an identity crisis, which consequently led to several steps of 
transformations in terms of vision and goals, military capacity, and geographical field of 
operations in order to adapt itself to its new era and context (Græger 2009). 
Change and transformation in NATO has been determined by political ambitions and 
operational experiences after the Cold War, and Græger (2009) argues that the operational 
experiences came from the experiences gained during the Balkan wars in the 90s. After the 
end of the Cold War when NATO politically adopted a new Strategic Concept (1991), a new 
political direction that adjusted NATO’s threat perception from a fear of Russian intervention 
on European soil, to “diverse and multi-directional risks”. As a result, budgets, strategic 
planning, and force and command structures went through a series of reforms that signalized 
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the start of NATO transformation after the Cold War. From an operational perspective the 
Balkan operations made alliance members realize that the political context it was operating 
within was in rapid change. Apart from the fact that these were the first operations ever 
executed under the NATO flag, the operations also sent NATO into a completely new 
business, namely the business of “out-of-area”-operations. 
The changes and experiences after the 90’s proved and accentuated that closing the gap 
between American and European defense capabilities was needed to improve NATO’s ability 
not only to fulfill Article 5 for collective defense, but also to meet emerging security 
challenges. One of the capabilities gap, as Ulriksen points out, was that European armies 
since Bosnia had focused doctrinal efforts and acquired substantial skills in peacekeeping and 
stabilization operations – while they have not had any significant developments on its own 
war-fighting doctrine – or even reflected whether Europe really needs such a doctrine 
(Ulriksen 2007b). A high-intensity NATO-operation run independently by European allies 
was therefore an important ambition for further transformation efforts articulated in the DCI 
from 1999.  
Furthermore, 9/11 further widened the gap between European and US forces, as many 
European states were neither able nor willing to carry through out-of-area operations in the 
same full strength as the Americans. These two eras of operational experiences must be seen 
in context and as the raison d'être for the decisions and initiatives that are presented in the 
next sections. 
4.1.1 Washington Summit 1999: Defense Capabilities Initiative  
At the summit in Washington D.C. April 1999, the alliance launched DCI, which was 
intended not only to improve the ability to Article 5 commitments, but also to meet new 
emerging security challenges. To accomplish these tasks, the alliance had to ensure that its 
troops had the appropriate equipment, supplies, transport, communications, and training. DCI 
consisted of 59 operational “action items that NATO seemingly needed to improve. These 
action items were related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks; ensuring 
command, communication and information superiority; improving interoperability of 
deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid deployment and 
sustainment of forces” (Buckley 2002, Lindley-French 2007, Berdal and Ucko 2010), and 
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categorized under deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, 
consultation, command and control, and effective engagement 16. 
Many experts claim that DCI was to a large degree articulated and determined by the US 
(Heier 2006, Lindley-French 2007, p. 85, Berdal and Ucko 2010) to prepare the European 
allies for the challenges ahead, and as an American test of European seriousness involving the 
five areas that DCI addressed. The dilemma European allies were facing, was whether it 
wanted to continue the development of military capabilities in another direction than US 
capabilities, which supposedly would result in a dual-track NATO transformation, one going 
in the war-fighting direction whilst the other towards peace and stability operations. Although 
DCI benefitted the US due to influence on Europe’s evolution (Binnendijk and Kugler 2003), 
the effect of this divergent development could also be that European forces would only 
function in degraded mode outside US/NATO operations. The latter effect would thus ensure 
or maintain a firm US grip on Europe – or as William Pfaff (2002) stated it; making Europe 
Pentagon’s Foreign Legion. 
European compliance to DCI however, later on turned out to be harder than expected due to 
political reluctance and that the action items and DCI as a whole demanded an increase in 
European defense budgets – an increase that never came. The US mistrust in European 
capabilities proved evident in the wake of 9/11 (Ek 2007), when US forces initiated a US-
initiated and led operation invading Afghanistan because of the experiences of poor decision-
making in Kosovo that was coined “war by committees”17  –again stressing the needs to adapt 
the Alliance. 
4.1.2 Prague Summit 2002: Prague Capabilities Commitments  
9/11 accentuated NATO’s political differences plaguing the Alliance (Berdal and Ucko 2010), 
and the failures to address the DCI further widened the political gaps across the Atlantic. It 
can also be argued that DCI’s vagueness and lack of ability to commit NATO member 
countries, combined with the difficulties in measuring actual effect, led to a second significant 
effort of transforming NATO, namely PCC. At the Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State 
                                                
16 See http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/capabilities/html_en/capabilities04.html  
17 Targets in Kosovo were not chosen, but voted on by NATO diplomats. NATOs first war in 
its 50 years existence was implemented through a democratic process. 
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and Government took another round of crucial decisions affecting the Alliance’s role in Euro-
Atlantic security and its ability to adjust to new priorities and to adapt its capabilities in order 
to meet new challenges after the Cold War.  
One of the decisions the summit in 2002 reached was the PCC, which is also coined “the 
godson” of DCI. DCI and PCC are similar in the sense that they have the same ultimate 
objective: to deliver the urgently needed capability improvements that the Alliance needs to 
carry out its missions. However, as former assistant Secretary General for NATO Defense 
planning and Operations division Edgar Buckley points out18, there are three main, significant 
differences between DCI and PCC. Firstly, the focus is a lot sharper than its predecessor DCI 
since the goals are more operationalized and articulated and hence easier to follow up and 
measure. Secondly, it is based on a different and much tougher form of state commitment. 
Finally, PCC includes a much greater emphasis on multinational cooperation, including role 
specialization, and mutual reinforcement with EU’s drive to develop military capabilities 
(Buckley 2002). 
These three main differences constitutes the prerequisites that the Prague Summit believed 
were critical factors needed for a transformation going the right way. The sharper focus and 
the detailed list of specific shortfalls in PCC committed allied states more than earlier. 
Although the PCC is classified, Buckley informs that its action items are quite specific and 
even has fixed time frames to each of the items. In addition, the Prague Summit 
acknowledged that the members could not acquire several of the improved capabilities 
required by NATO separately. The need for multinational solutions and “pooling and sharing” 
of capabilities was therefore emphasized and encouraged, reflected in PCC and the overall 
outcomes of the summit in 2002 (Buckley 2002). 
At the same summit and in addition to the PCC, another major decision was made in order to 
promote transformation. In order to efficiently adapt and prepare the military organization to 
new challenges, NATO needed a command structure reform. This led to the establishment of 
ACT in Norfolk, VA, which was given the ambitious mission to create a strategic combined 
and joint capability that had global reach through network-enabled forces operating at high 
levels of technical and doctrinal interoperability. ACT’s priority was to be NATO’s engine 
and coordinating actor for change, and include transforming NATO’s military capabilities; 
                                                
18 Edgar Buckley’s article was written before the Prague Summit. 
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preparing, supporting and sustaining Alliance operations; implementing the NRF and other 
deployable capabilities; achieving full operational capability; and, of equal importance, 
assisting the transformation of partner capabilities (Lindley-French 2007).  
ACT was intended to be NATO’s leading agent for change, driving, facilitating, and 
advocating continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the 
military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance. The command directs ACT's various 
subordinate commands including the Joint Warfare Centre (ACT JWC), The Joint Forces 
Training Centre (ACT JFTC), the NATO Undersea Research Centre (ACT NURC), various 
NATO Schools, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (ACT JALLC). It also has a 
Transformation Network (TRANSNET) support element consisting of 14 officers and 
civilians meant to support and accredit the network of COEs.  
Whether ACT has succeeded or not, transformation is still a hot topic in the Alliance. Notably 
after the financial turmoil from 2007 and onwards, NATO has had a stronger need for 
transformation, with an extra emphasis on cost-effective solutions as NATO entered 2012. 
4.1.3 Chicago 2012: Making Defense Smart 
Many argue that DCI and PCC’s ambitions are still not achieved, but the Alliance has 
nevertheless reached for new strategic and capability ambitions through the latest strategic 
concept from the Lisbon Summit in 2010, thus making the need for transformation more 
pressing. Transformation has become a buzzword and still an important element in today’s 
security policy agenda, and the next NATO Summit that takes place in Chicago May 2012 is 
a clear indicator of this. This is a summit where “Smart Defense” is one of the most important 
topics on the agenda, a term that was coined by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen at the Munich Security conference in 2011. The Secretary General has argued that 
it was “time to make better use of NATO as an adviser and an honest broker - to ensure a 
degree of coherence in any cuts which states may consider, and to minimize their impact on 
the overall effectiveness of the Alliance”19. Coined in a different way, Smart Defense is about 
“doing more with less” with an emphasis on multilateral solutions in order to achieve 
coherency within the Alliance – and to achieve NATO’s ambitions despite times of austerity 
and tight economic times. This political rhetoric tells us that transformation is indeed essential 
                                                
19 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70327.htm  
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in order for the Alliance to handle the financial challenges its states faces, and arguably also a 
sign that the Secretary General is struggling to revitalize the transformational agenda that 
stems back to DCI and PCC by politically rebranding and renaming transformation. 
4.2 NATO Centers of Excellence 
The concept COE was created to offer recognized expertise and experience to the benefit of 
the Alliance, above all in support of the Alliance, and although a specific COE is not part of 
the NCS, it forms part of the wider framework supporting NATO command arrangements. In 
this respect, the COE as a concept is delimited to the wider framework of the 16 COEs (+ four 
in the process of being accredited), including ACT’s role in accrediting, assessing and 
developing the concept. According to ACT, COEs are supposed to focus on four types of 
value creation: 
• Enhancing education and training (including training support) 
• Improving interoperability and capabilities 
• Assist in doctrine development and/or test and validate concepts through 
experimentation  
• Offer analysis and Lessons Learned  
The concept has five central principles that relate to participation, added value, resources, 
NATO standards and clear relationships, and these principles apply for the wider framework 
of COE: 
Participation denotes that involvement in COE activities is open to primarily all allies. 
Access by other partners, other states and international organizations to COE products 
however, is the responsibility of sponsoring states, taking into account security requirements. 
This means that practically any actor can formally (or informally) cooperate with a specific 
COE. Also in regard to participation, a governing principle is that the manning of a COE is 
national and/or decided by its sponsoring states.  
Added value stresses that there should be added value only and no duplication, a principle 
stressing that a mandatory purpose for COE is to provide improvement to NATO capabilities 
rather than competition.  
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Resources regulate amongst whom and how COE infrastructure, operating and maintenance 
costs are to be funded. Under this principle lies also the expectation that COEs are not at the 
expense of NCS and personnel warrants.  
Furthermore, NATO standards imply that a COE is to conform to appropriate NATO 
procedures, doctrines and standards. Nevertheless, a COE is encouraged to suggest and 
propose amendments to doctrines, procedures and standards as and when appropriate, for 
subsequent endorsement and/or ACT/NATO. 
Finally, a clear relationship is states that the sponsoring states and the appropriate steering 
committees are to define clear relationships and guidelines through Memorandums of 
Understandings (MOUs) and technical arrangements. These documents cover administrative 
and practical agreements and governing principles that apply specifically for the respective 
COEs.  
Concerning clear relationships and further developing COE as a concept, ACT also plays a 
role in three ways regarding COEs. Firstly, ACT is responsible for accrediting COEs that are 
offered by a sponsoring state. SACT here develops the criteria for this process, based on the 
five principles mentioned above. Secondly, to ensure it still meets these principles, ACT 
periodically screens a COE. If the COE fails to meet ACT’s criteria, ACT will then 
recommend the necessary steps to be taken in order to regain accreditation. There is yet to be 
a center that has lost its ACT accreditation, but it is hypothetically possible. Thirdly, it is 
ACT’s responsibility to identify areas of military activity where there are gaps in expertise 
that an existing COE should target, or where a new COE might be appropriate.  
4.2.1 The Population of Different Centers of Excellence 
There are 16 accredited centers and 4 COEs in development, and they are all unique in their 
own manner. The centers range from newer and transnational subjects matters as energy 
security (COE-ENSEC), defense against terrorism (COE-DAT), and cooperative cyber 
defense (COE-CCD), to more traditional defense subject matters as command and control 
(COE-C2), human intelligence (COE-HUMINT), and military medicine (COE-MILMED). 
Each COE is different from the others in a number of ways, where one of the most important 
differences is the number of supporting states to each center; none at the lowest (only one 
framework state, no supporting states) to 17 (framework state + 16 supporting). The degree of 
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multilateralism and actual size in terms of personnel is therefore different from each center. 
The following table (table 2) shows the whole population of accredited and non-accredited 
COEs according to ACT. 
Table 2 over COEs in NATO. Center in italic are in the process of being accredited. Source: ACT Transformation 
Network (https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE) 
Subject matter Framework state No of 
supporting 
states * 
Personnel 
warrants (PE)**  
Command and control (C2) Netherlands 7 22/21 
Analysis and Simulation for Air Operations 
(CASPOA) 
France 1 30/42 
Cooperative Cyber Defense (CCD) Estonia 9 19/24 
Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) Spain 7 23/59 
Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Germany and the 
Netherlands 
6 51/56 
Combined Joint Operations from the Sea (CJOS) United States 12 27/32 
Operations for Confined and Shallow Waters (CSW) Germany 6 33/41 
Cold Weather Operations (CWO) Norway 0 4/4 
Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) Turkey 7 75/93 
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Romania 7 50/64 
Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) Germany 17 85/97 
Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear 
Defense (JCBRN) 
Czech Republic 10 58/64 
Military Engineering (MILENG) Germany + Hungary 14 30/38 
Military Medicine (MILMED) Hungary 6 31/43 
Naval Mine Warfare (NMW) Belgium and the 
Netherlands 
3 - 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Slovakia 5 14/24 
Modeling and simulation (M&S)*** Italy - - 
Mountain Warfare (MW)*** Slovenia - - 
Military Police (MP)*** Poland - - 
Energy security (ENSEC)*** Lithuania - - 
* Information collected from the respective COE’s official webpages March 2012 
** PE stands for peacetime establishment, a term that means authorized peacetime manpower requirement for a unit, 
formation or headquarters. Also called peacetime complement or personnel warrants. The numbers are collected from ACT’s 
COE Catalogue published in February 2011. The numbers are positions occupied compared to the total number of warrants 
*** COE in development, not yet NATO accredited (March 27th 2012) 
Ever since the first COE was established, the network has developed rapidly. The number of 
supporting states for the respective centers is increasing every year, so are the numbers of 
accredited centers. The most recent news of a state that is in the process of accreditation is 
38 
 
Lithuania and a center on energy security (COE-ENSEC). Lithuania just hosted a 1st MOU-
conference, in which ACT by TNB and 16 states participated (amongst others Norway). 
Similar processes are also in the making for three other centers seeking accreditation (COE 
for Model and Simulation (MS), Mountain Warfare (MW), and Military Police (MP)). 
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5 Analysis 
This chapter will present the empirical evidence collected and organized on the theoretical 
basis described in chapter two on theoretical framework, and  as described in chapter three on 
methodology. The chapter is structured in such a way that it reflects the two research 
questions.  
The first part will systematically present some of the telling quotes from the empirical 
evidence to illustrate the matches with the institutional logics analytical framework. This will 
be done by first assessing the logics two by two (four in total), and then discuss which logics 
that seem more prevailing or obvious than others. The second part will first assess the role(s) 
that the COE concept plays in the field of defense transformation in NATO. It will then use 
the findings from the first part that constitute the concept´s rationale, and respectively analyze 
the concept’s strategic intention, relevance and importance. 
5.1 Identifying Institutional Logics 
The first research question is analyzed by matching the empirical evidence to the theoretical 
expectations, and is presented in pairs of institutional logics. This section will first analyze the 
four institutional logics before it summarizes the matches of the logics with the empirical 
evidence. 
5.1.1 Defense Sovereignty vs. Defense Solidarity 
Indicators of Defense Sovereignty 
The following empirical assumptions would support a logic of defense sovereignty: 1.1) a 
primacy of state interests in governing COE, 1.2) a governing body and principles played out 
by officers/eq. that act on behalf of their state interests, and 1.3) requests for support (RFS) 
are given less priority. The empirical data prove a limited presence of a logic of defense 
sovereignty, but nevertheless support the logic in terms of how centers organize themselves. 
When it comes to what the appropriate sources of influence on the COE´s scope and mission, 
the evidence proves inadequate to support the institutional logic of defense sovereignty. The 
arguments are systematically presented supported in the following sections. 
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In regard to the state interests in governing COEs (1.1), the findings show that the concept is 
based on a “bottom-up” approach, which seems to be an important principle that centers are 
operated and governed by the involved states (framework state(s) + supporting states). 
Admiral Jo Gade, one of my informants with solid experience from NATO’s International 
Military Staff (IMS), points this out particularly clearly: 
“The fact that the nations are free to organize themselves is natural in many ways, it is 
after all the framework and supporting nations that are paying all the basic costs [..] this is 
cost-free for NATO, so if NATO starts interfering, I think the nations would react”.20 
Gade’s point is that those who pay for a center are those who are the rightful decision-makers. 
This is also regulated through the five governing principles for COEs, mainly participation 
and clear relationships, in which both emphasize autonomy in terms of governing themselves. 
Lt. Col. Terje Roa is currently stationed at the COE-JAPCC, and further elaborates by 
pointing out what the practical consequences of this is: 
“Since COEs are outside NATO command structure and only has status as a NATO 
body, NATO has no authority or responsibility. This implies that all products that run out of 
COEs are only of an advisory character”.21 
 This means that the respective centers are autonomous, as agreed on in the governing MC-
document, MOUs and technical agreements amongst involved states. This formal autonomy, 
as stressed by my informants, is nevertheless restricted to governing the respective centers in 
terms of resources and personnel. When it comes to requests for support however, lt. col. Roa 
is concerned that this independence from NATO structures must be limited to how the centers 
solve their missions within a given scope, and he signals an inconvenience on the notion that 
centers are independent in the sense that they decide fully on what mission they should solve, 
and within what scope. Roa writes that 
“Certain elements are concerned that COEs should not pay attention to requests for 
support from anyone since they are independent, but that they should only comply to others 
when suitable to the involved nations”. 22 
Other informants also support this notion, and emphasize that the COE concept will lose its 
relevance if it is to tear loose entirely from NATO’s transformational agenda, and instead go 
                                                
20 Interview with Jo Gade 
21 E-mail interview with Terje Roa 
22 E-mail interview with Terje Roa 
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independent. The quote also depicts the clear limitation on a potential logic of defense 
sovereignty; It is only perceived as appropriate that COEs are sovereign in terms of governing 
COEs, but that this perception of appropriateness does not apply in terms of the principles that 
govern a COE’s scope, missions and concrete projects.  
Nevertheless, Lt. Col. Geir Furø, an officer with four years of experience as a staff officer at 
the C2COE in the Netherlands, stressed state interests when governing the program of work 
within his COE. He states that 
“[..] we were very clear that we were most the offensive ones within the COE to get 
something out of the cooperation and that had to be in Norway’s interest.”23 
Despite this point, another informant who wished to stay anonymous on that specific quote, 
implied that state interest could only be achieved if it harmonizes with ACTs and NATOs 
needs. He supports this by an incident at one COE, where one state tried to outmaneuver other 
states in order to gain their own state interests. Nonetheless, it seemed that this was a result of 
weak leadership during that period of time, and that this state was dealt with later on. As the 
officer emphasized, the state’s officers in that specific COE “kept in their place”, by clearly 
sanctioning the behavior because its interests did not correspond with common interests. 
Again, the empirical evidence supports the notion that achieving state interest is appropriate, 
but only if it corresponds with common interests.  
Although state interest did not seem to dominate the COEs program of work, the participation 
in a COE itself seemed to be highly esteemed and in the state interest. Participation in a 
NATO project to achieve status and recognition is called flag waving, and illustrates the 
aspect that contributions are mere politics, making the signal effect of contributing to NATO 
a state interest. Since the command structure reforms since the Prague Summit 2002, admiral 
Gade argues that 
“Even though we saw a tug of war to keep central commands and headquarters on the 
different territories, most countries have understood that they could never achieve a new 
NATO headquarter on their soil [..]. With today’s resources it is clear it will never even 
happen. In that respect, COE has a good NATO flag effect. [..] It is obvious that having 
NATOs flag on their territory has a certain prestige, especially for newer members that are 
                                                
23 Interview with Geir Furø 
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stressing for their own population but also for others that NATO cares about them. I believe 
that COEs play an important role in emphasizing that “NATO is here too”.”24 
Several others also emphasize the important effect of flag waiving for framework states, an 
effect for contributing countries in NATO that must not be underestimated, regardless of what 
they contribute. Nonetheless, is freedom to organize a center and the effect of flag waving the 
only elements where a logic of defense sovereignty seems to be dominant? It seems so, 
according to Lt. Col. Roa, as he states that 
“[..] the respective sponsoring nation shows too little interest in identifying and using 
COE outcomes compared to the resources they put in in the center. They’re are in many ways 
content that they have given their resources, and leave the responsibility for others to govern 
the resources in a best possible way. The responsibility for maximizing the outcome with the 
given resources is mostly left for the COEs themselves.”25 
Lt. Col. Roa also claims that at his center, “the respective sponsoring states (all of them) have 
had more focus on flag waiving and a show-off that they’re contributing to NATO rather than 
seeing what results they can get out of their states’ contributions”. Although only one senior 
staff officer affiliated with a ministry of defense (MOD, the Norwegian more specifically) 
was interviewed, also he signaled that the Norwegian MOD has very little to do at all with 
COEs other than assessing whether Norway should formally support other foreign COEs. The 
fact that the Norwegian MOD has nothing/little to do with the COE concept could indicate 
that state interests do not play a very strong role in the COE concept. Nonetheless, just using 
one example on on the relationship between MOD-COE could prove inconclusive, but the 
finding is interesting and weakens the assumption of a strong logic of defense sovereignty 
within the COE concept, and is therefore taken into account when considering the logic as 
whole. 
The last indicator expected that RFS are given less priority (1.3), but the empirical evidence 
supporting this indicator was not mentioned at all. On the contrary, my evidence supports the 
opposite, namely that RFS are of high priority for the COE concept. These findings will be 
properly elaborated under the logic of defense solidarity.  
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Indicators of Defense Solidarity 
The logic of defense solidarity (logic 2) would mean that the empirical evidence would 
support 2.1) a primacy of NATO needs and interests in administering a COE, 2.2) subject 
matter experts that constitute governing bodies and principles in which military professional 
needs is the top priority, and 2.3) that requests for support (RFS) are given high priorities. In 
contrast to the former logic, it seems that a logic of defense solidarity matches the empirical 
evidence a lot better. There is one difference however, namely that the logic of sovereignty is 
evident in regard to organizing the centers (e.g. formal agreements), whereas the logic of 
defense solidarity is appropriate in terms of what the centers work on or get its directions 
from. This difference is supported more or less by all informants, and will be presented in the 
following section. 
When asked whether COE’s configuration strikes the right balance between solidarity and 
sovereignty in transforming NATO, it might be natural to start with the one of the statements 
given by the commander of ACT: 
”COE’s configuration enables them to respond to relevant and time-critical problems, 
as well as work on projects for future needs. Requests for support (RFS) are collected through 
the annual COE Program of Work development process, which is the primary tool for 
coordination of NATO input to each COE.”26  
These requests, responses and tools for coordination seem to be heavily regulated by the ACT 
TNB. Every year there is a COE Director’s Conference that all centers chiefs participate in, 
and where ACT’s coordinating role is more evident. The event’s aim is to discuss NATO-
COE cooperation, to determine a way ahead and broaden COE director’s networking in order 
to increase individual and collective effectiveness of the centers27. The previous COE 
Director’s conference was at COE-CASPOA in October 2011, and prior to that ACT TNB 
organized a COE workshop in March 2011 in Norfolk (VA) United States, in which they 
develop the drafts to the respective COEs program of work that were subject to formal 
approbation at the Director’s Conference. From this, ACT arguably gains a strong position to 
regulate the COE network. As one of the senior staff officers actually (in confidence) states 
that it is 
                                                
26 From an online Q&A seesion with gen. Abrial hosted by Atlantic Community (see 
appendix A) 
27 From ACT’s transformation network intranet https://transnet.act.nato.int/  
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“ACT that coordinate and send COEs drafts for their programs of work, before the 
COEs send to sponsoring nations for their feedback, before the programs go back to ACT for 
further processing and coordination.”28 
The quote states that ACT is both the first and final point of every draft for the respective 
COE’s program of work, something that seems to be a natural part of the COE concept in the 
sense that the senior staff officers that were interviewed did not perceive these coordination 
mechanisms conflicting national interest, but rather an advantage. Is this respect, ACT 
arguably has a lot of de facto agenda-setting power when it comes to what projects that COEs 
work with. Chief of the Transformation Network Branch ACT col. Storm explains that 
“RFS are submitted by ACT to COEs once a year, in July-August time frame. They are 
taken very “seriously” by COEs and practically all are included in COE programs of works 
(POW). This is ensured by the staff level coordination during the whole process of COE 
Program of Work (POW) development process.”29 
These processes and the notion that COEs takes these very “seriously”, support the indicator 
that RFS are of high priority. It seems that RFS are so important to the COE concept, that 
there is also a mechanism to process urgent (out of cycle – OOC) RFS, as col. Storm 
elaborates: 
“OOC RFS are submitted on ad hoc bases, out of the regular process. They are 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. ACT will provide support to the center, for example, ACT 
may provide support when the prioritization of the new OOC RFS would affect COE 
resources already utilized in support for existing RFS.”30 
This means that RFS can be sent to COEs continuously, seemingly based on what the 
Alliance needs. Lt Col Roa underlines the importance of taking these RFS seriously, because 
“[i]f COEs want to maintain their relevance in the future, their Program of Work 
(POW) must be linked to those priorities and demands that come from NATO and sponsoring 
nations.”31  
One informant suggested making the COE concept more responsive and agile to pressing 
needs directed from ACT, supplementing the evidence for a logic of defense solidarity: 
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29 E-mail interview with Helmar Storm 
30 E-mail interview with Helmar Storm 
31 E-mail interview with Terje Roa 
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“[i]t would be better to do POW every six months so you can eliminate the projects 
that were never realized, and so that we can update more relevant projects – this would 
highly improve the percentage of projects that would actually be executed and finished.” 
Still, lt. col. Roa went even further and stated that despite the role ACT has in regulating 
COEs as described in the former quote, there is need for even supranational regulation, as he 
has experienced 
“a lack of guidelines and enthusiasm from NATO and supporting nations to really 
exploit the capacity that JAPCC and other COEs represent.”32 
Roa is perhaps the clearest voice for a stronger ACT regulation of COEs, with the point that 
alternative solutions have been created to fill in the gaps after NATO command structure 
reforms, but without the necessary governing, steering, and coordinating mechanisms to 
compensate for independent multilateral solutions. In other words, COEs are thought to 
balance a leaner NCS, but is a counterweight that risks its relevance and relation to NATO if 
there are not formalized (if not rigid) connections between the two. Several others informants 
implicitly or explicitly support this notion, but in different degrees. Nevertheless, the 
perception that it is appropriate that COEs support ACT through requests for support is very 
strong among the informants (indicator 2.3), and thus supports a logic of defense solidarity. 
The empirical evidence also suggests that the COE concept is “subject matter expertise first, 
state interests later”. As described under the sections assessing the logic of defense 
sovereignty, it seemed that the Norwegian MOD was minimally involved in the COE concept. 
With the notable exceptions of flag waiving and how to organize the centers, the COE concept 
seems to be driven by military professional needs and principles, supporting the first and 
second empirical indicator for this logic (indicator 2.2).  
5.1.2 Defense Exclusiveness vs. Defense Pluralism 
Defense Exclusiveness 
The institutional logic that matches the empirical evidence the least is the logic of defense 
exclusiveness. The empirical expectations for this particular logic were three-fold, one could 
expect 3.1) no room for partnerships with states or international organizations 3.2) little to no 
civil-military cooperation with other external entities (industry, private companies, schools, 
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universities, research institutes, etc.), and 3.3) restrictive information sharing. Even though 
ACT strongly encourages the two types of relationships described in the two first indicators, it 
is not obvious that a given COE is willing to follow this. Nevertheless, this does not seem to 
be the case at all concerning COEs, where evidence that would support a logic of defense 
exclusiveness was non-sufficient. In terms of indicator three on the other hand, there seemed 
to be some evidence that there were some exclusive routines for information sharing. 
However, as the evidence will show, this was just one situation that was discussed, and that 
later turned out to be sanctioned because it was considered inappropriate. 
Having empirical evidence that is limited to the last indicator of this logic (indicator 3.3), the 
evidence revealed a challenge that was related to information sharing between NATO 
member countries and non-NATO countries. As part of his position at a specific COE, one 
staff officer had conducted several assessments for national and multilateral capabilities in his 
position in a COE. This Norwegian officer specifically mentioned that he had done an 
assessment for a EU Battle Group (EUBG), which he stated was 
“[..] carried through as a EU confidential or EU restricted assessment, so we, as a 
Norwegians, could not take part in the report, even though we showed the Norwegian flag 
and said come on, we’re a sponsoring nation.”33 
This statement shows that diversity in standards and information sharing procedures was an 
initial problem that led to one of the sponsoring state not getting access to a product of the 
center it was part of. Nonetheless, using this incident to support a logic of defense 
exclusiveness would be insufficient, as the same staff officer later said that 
“[..] it was later on decided that all information that was retrieved by the COE was to 
be shared with everyone, it then had to be published in an individual publication classified as 
a NATO classified releasable to all, [..] to avoid getting into the same situation, the principle 
is that all information must be shared with all participating nations.” 
These two quotes exemplifies that a regime for classifying sensitive information can (and has 
in this case) hindered information sharing within a COE project, and supports that these 
regulations per se impede effective information sharing. However, and as the second quote 
shows, the principle that all information must be shared with all participating states in a 
project regardless of institutional affiliation, trumps the significance of classifying standards 
for information sharing. Indeed, another officer stressed that these principles concerning 
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information sharing seemed to be systematically ignored because it conflicted with the 
mission of the COE concept – information was shared under-the-table.  
From the arguments presented in the former sections, it is reasonable to conclude that a logic 
of defense exclusiveness is non-sufficient to non-existent. The participants do express that it 
is not appropriate that the COE concept is exclusive in terms of the three indicators, most 
vocally concerning information sharing (indicator 3.3). The example of EUBG assessment 
admittedly revealed a hinder for effective information sharing with non-EU entities, but the 
perception that “all information must be shared with all participating states” easily trumps this 
formality both in regard to an institutional logic and practical solutions to reach a solution.   
Taking all the evidence into account, there is nothing that seem to indicate that a logic of 
defense exclusiveness dominates within the concept of COE. It is clear the MC document’s 
(NATO 2003) strong encouragements to establish and maintain strong relationships as 
described in the two first indicators of the logic presented in the theoretical framework are in 
sync with the personnel interviewed. In other words, the indicators were not present, and 
cannot support a logic of defense exclusiveness. In terms of information sharing however, 
there was one example that proved restrictive information sharing. When elaborated though, 
the experience gained by that specific center made changes that were not consistent with the 
third empirical indicator of the logic. Assessing the evidence of the logic of defense pluralism 
on the other hand, will conversely show why and how pluralism matches the empirical 
evidence must stronger, and consequently weakening the logic of defense exclusiveness 
furthermore. 
Logic of Defense Pluralism  
Together with the logic of solidarity, the logic of defense pluralism matches the empirical 
evidence the best out of the four institutional logics. According to the theoretical framework, 
the logic of defense solidarity implies 1) that partnerships with states or international 
organizations are highly esteemed, 2) a high degree of civil-military cooperation with other 
external entities (industry, private companies, schools, universities, etc.), and 3) effective 
information sharing. These three indicators were clearly evident throughout the empirical 
material collected for this thesis, and will be systematically presented in the following 
sections. 
48 
 
The first indicator was first of all clearly stated in terms of partnerships with other states 
outside NATO (indicator 4.1). The clearest example is Finland, which is formally a 
supporting state to COE for Operations for Confined and Shallow Waters (CSW) in Germany, 
although the state is not part of NATO. Furthermore, the Norwegian COE-CWO also 
informally involves Sweden and Finland in their winter training, seminars and courses, 
although they are not part of NATO. Who the respective COEs collaborate with can therefore 
seem to be more partner-driven beyond its alliance-orientation, and COE-JAPCC’s policy on 
partnerships also seems to apply for the concept as such: 
“COE-JAPCC is open for, and working actively to establish contact with actors 
outside the traditional chains of command, hereby EU, industry, PfP, etc. The contact varies 
depending on how deep it goes. It can happen through participation in meetings, give briefs, 
and directly cooperate in solving specific projects.”34 
This openness for partnerships is also evident for international organizations, where the EU 
seems to be a natural partner for the COE concept and its respective centers. The officers 
interviewed seemed to be eager to collaborate beyond the NATO framework, thus indicating a 
fatigue after political conflicts that have formerly hindered military cooperation. When asked 
whether EU, PfP and other non-NATO countries had the possibility to participate in any form 
of COE cooperation, admiral Gade stated that: 
“You do have this NATO-EU challenge [..] I think it is sad that we haven’t come 
longer than we have today, because the intentions are so good. Sec. Gen. in NATO and 
baroness Ashton continuously state that we have to improve processes. That won’t be possible 
without a political solution to the Cyprus-conflict.”35 
This political obstacle was despite this NATO-EU challenge overcome whenever possible. In 
particular in regard to developing capabilities, the admiral emphasizes that within the 21 
common members of EU and NATO, there are common interests and democratic values, it is 
“a disaster that we waste so much time and energy doing thing in our own respective ways”. 
Gade elaborates that: 
“As long as you don’t involve all nations on political level, we see that there is 
excellent cooperation on ground between NATO and EU, also within the COE concept. At 
staff level, in IMS and EU’s military staff: incredibly good cooperation, we exchanged 
information on every area. We had no limits, documents or anything, and kept each other 
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posted on everything. But the minute you want something approved on institutional level, then 
the Greeks, Cypriots and Turks blocks everything.”36 
Because the COE concept is not constantly dependent on approvals, agreements and 
consensus from these institutional levels, but rather only the states that are formally 
represented in a respective COE’s steering group, the concept and principles thereby serve as 
a backdoor to a stronger partnership between NATO (through specific COEs) and EU 
members (and institution as whole). Encouragements to engage non-NATO countries as 
contributing partners seemed to be followed, and could be an possible starting point for 
expanding the NATO-EU partnership, without going through the institutional level. The 
personnel interviewed seemed to have no problem at all to use this backdoor to cement EU-
NATO cooperation, on the contrary they followed ACT’s encouragements to establish and 
maintain these kinds of relationships, and seemed eager to cooperate beyond the NATO 
framework. 
The second indicator (4.2) implies a high degree of civil-military cooperation with other 
external entities (industry, private companies, schools, universities, etc.). This indicator seems 
to be strongly supported throughout the empirical evidence. Naval officer Ove Nyaas states 
this quite simply by saying 
“[o]ur threshold is low, we use external non-military actors in a lot of our ongoing 
work. Especially during our annual Maritime Security Conference, where it is exactly these 
actors that are central for the conference.”37 
This low threshold seems to be found in regard to the specific centers and also as a concept as 
whole, and is perceived as a strength for the concept. The informants acknowledge that COEs 
does not only serve as hubs for information and best practices, but may also serve as a 
matchmaker between private institutions with expertise on one subject matter area and state 
militaries (and NATO as alliance). One magnificent example of this matchmaking is between 
the COE for civil-military cooperation (COE-CIMIC) and NGOs that work on the same issues 
as the COE. Chief for ACT TNB explains: 
“A COE, such as CIMIC COE, has a vital interest in building and maintaining 
relationships with non-military actors. [..] COEs have the unique capability to build 
relationships with non-military actors, particularly international organizations and NGOs, 
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without the constraint of NATO or military setting. The reason for this was explained by the 
COE-CIMIC– sometimes the large NGOs are reluctant to cooperate with NATO as they see it 
as a pure military organization. Yet, these same organizations see the COEs as somewhat less 
than a pure military organization simply because the COE is independent and not part of the 
NATO command structure.”38  
Col. Storm perceived this configuration and potential for cooperation as a “huge advantage to 
NATO as we can effectively leverage this relationship”. Although advantageous, leveraging 
this potential advantage was not perceived stress-free by all informants. Lt. col. Furø voiced 
his concerns, mainly in regard to private companies and industry, as he stated that 
“It takes a lot of effort to monitor and supervise contacts in individual private 
companies. In this case it’s better to follow up a whole organization that again follows up 
their private companies. [..] it is important to be careful, especially in regard to the industry, 
to be honest and transparent. [..] There were several advocates for more contact with the 
industry that could have given NATO a lot in return, but it just took too much of resources 
that we already had little of.”39 
Although this quote supports the second indicator (4.2), it clearly states that even though it is 
perceived appropriate to maintain a high degree of civil-military cooperation (with industry in 
this case), it is demanding since it is constraining a COE’s resources. 
The very last indicator (4.3) implies that effective information sharing is important within the 
concept of COE. As discussed in the logic of defense exclusiveness, regimes for information 
classification seemed to be a hinder for effective information sharing (indicator 4.3). 
However, the incident was only an initial challenge that was more or less eliminated because 
the specific COE’s governing body found it more appropriate that all participating states in a 
project must have the same access to information. This finding does not only dismiss the 
indicator of restrictive information sharing under the logic of defense exclusiveness (3.3), it 
also strengthens the indicator that effective information sharing (and thus the logic of defense 
pluralism) is highly valued within the concept (4.3).  
If COEs can be seen as clusters of states working on common endeavors in the framework of 
NATO, what is perceived as the appropriate level of information sharing beyond the 
participating states in a specific COE? General Orderud Skare states that all allies must have 
access to outcomes from COE projects regardless of degree of involvement: 
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“Denmark is not formally supporting any COEs, they don’t host any themselves, and 
don’t have any officers affiliated within the centers or the concept as whole. They’ve chosen 
to stay completely outside the COE network, but do they have access to these products? Of 
course they have access to them if they want.”40 
The view that it is appropriate that the COE products are open to all allies beyond the 
framework and supporting states is a common one in the empirical material for this thesis, but 
this notion does not seem to automatically mean that all allies in fact receive COE products: 
“Yes, the whole of NATO has access. Not only sponsoring nations and ACT and ACO, 
but all the NATO nations. I guess we didn’t send to all allies automatically, only to the NATO 
bodies and the supporting nations.”41 
If however, some states beyond the constellation of states that run a COE have some kind of 
interest in a COE product, they need to know that someone is actually producing whatever is 
in their interest – and that they have access to these products. The empirical evidence show 
that the COE’s product might not be sufficiently visible and known in the Alliance to realize 
the full potential of the concept, which can be said to be a hinder to achieve openness that the 
indicator implies. Lt Col Roa did righteously state that there is a lack of willingness to exploit 
the capacity that his COE (COE-JAPCC) represent (see the last quote in the section for 
defense solidarity), and other informants also imply that there is a lack of knowledge (or 
visibility) to what the COE concept can actually provide to allied forces. Although making the 
centers more visible probably would increase the effectiveness of information sharing even 
more, the indicator that information sharing is nevertheless perceived as quite important, if 
not one of the success criteria for the concept as whole, according to the empirical material. 
Taking the evidence that support the three indicators of a logic of defense pluralism into 
consideration, there is little doubt that this logic represent a set of features and characteristics 
of the COE concept that the informants view as appropriate. Despite some hinders to effective 
partnerships and information sharing, the value of these qualities are admired and seemingly 
pursued within the COE concept.  
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5.1.3 Matching the Patterns – What Logics Dominate COEs? 
Coming back to the first research question on which institutional logics that can be identified 
in regard to what COE solutions and features that are appropriate, it is clear that the logics of 
defense solidarity and logic of defense pluralism are the two logics that are most evident and 
dominating in the empirical material. This does however, not necessarily mean that the two 
other logics (sovereignty and exclusiveness) can be proven non-existent, as there can be 
singular elements that prove the opposite. Also worth repeating is one of the weaknesses of 
the case study, namely the danger of generalizing the conclusions gained by a small N (in this 
case the number of informants and their perceptions and feedback). 
Nevertheless, according to the logic of defense sovereignty the informants found it 
appropriate (and to a certain degree natural) that state interest will dominate questions 
concerning how to organize a specific center and flag waving as motivation to establish a 
center. In the other subordinate logic of exclusiveness however, there seemed to be no 
significant elements in the empirical evidence where a logic of exclusiveness was found 
appropriate. All the logics and their most significant findings in the empirical material lay the 
foundation for the concept´s rationale for further analysis on whether it is coherent with 
NATO strategic guideline, and the findings from the first research question is summarized in 
table 3: 
Table 3 Summary of the COEs institutional logics  
Logic of sovereignty (1) Logic of solidarity (2) 
• Should govern how COEs organize 
themselves  
• Flag waving (participation) 
• NATO should govern or regulate what COEs 
do (program of work) 
• Stresses the importance of RFS 
Logic of exclusiveness (3) Logic of pluralism (4) 
• None. • Encourages partnerships and civil-military 
cooperation 
• Encourages information sharing, despite 
NATO limitations 
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5.2 COE and its Role in NATO Transformation 
The second part of this chapter answers the second research question, namely what roles the 
COE concept play in the field of defense transformation in NATO, and what the concept’s 
strategic intention, relevance and importance is.  
The first element in the second research question seeks to answer what roles the concept 
actually plays. To answer that question, the thesis will first assess three potential roles that the 
COE concept might play in NATO transformation. Furthermore, a more overall qualitative 
assessment on whether the concept follows the same strategic logic as NATO transformation 
will be presented, by looking at the concept’s strategic intention, relevance and importance. 
The findings from the institutional logics analyzed in research question one are used as a 
foundation for what is understood as the concept´s rationale, understood as the set of reasons 
or a logical basis for the COE concept. This rationale will in the final part of the research 
question be analyzed to assess a potential match with NATO transformation strategic 
guidelines 1) national commitments, 2) role specialization, 3) pooling military capabilities, 4) 
interoperability, and 5) cost-effectiveness, and thus discussing the concept´s strategic 
intention, relevance and importance in regard to NATO transformation. 
5.2.1 COE’s Role in NATO Transformation 
The answer to what role COE might play in NATO transformation seems to be that the 
concept’s most important role (and potential) is primarily to identify transformational gaps in 
NATO, and to support specific capabilities and NATO as such in filling in these gaps. In 
terms of executing transformational needs, the concept does seem to have neither the 
authority nor the wish to have an operative role in NATO transformation. The following 
sections will elaborate findings regarding these three role perceptions within the COE 
concept. 
In regard to the role of identifying transformational needs, rear admiral Jo Gade was clear that 
COE has had an important role before all else when it comes to identifying specific Smart 
Defense projects. He states that 
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“It was ACT that had a lead role in regard to Smart Defense; they actually came with 
200 specific projects for Smart Defense initiatives to address transformational gaps, and 
COEs played a significant role in this”.42 
Identifying specific projects that can be categorized under Smart Defense is one thing; another 
thing is whether COEs actually identify operational gaps and potential through operational 
assessments. The officer that was quoted anonymously under section 5.1.1 (Logic of defense 
sovereignty) had conducted several assessments for state and multilateral capabilities in his 
position in a COE. The COE had developed a methodology for assessing different capabilities 
(from singular companies to multinational brigades/eq.). The sole purpose of these 
assessments was to identify gaps in capabilities and offer advice to the leadership of these 
capabilities on how to fill in these gaps. The emphasis that this specific center had on 
assessments and “mentoring” to reach overall transformational needs is something that was a 
recurring theme for all COEs or areas of expertise, making the COE concept’s role and 
potential for identifying transformational gaps and measures very apparent. Using the clusters 
of subject matter experts organized in COEs as inspectors for exercises and experiments to 
identify shortfalls is something that is an important role for COEs. Concerning the link 
between the COEs and NATO (mainly ACT), it is reasonable to expect that the standards and 
criteria for assessing capabilities are identical to NATO’s transformational needs, in 
coherence with the logic of defense solidarity.  
In addition to its role in identifying specific Smart Defense projects and pinpointing gaps and 
shortfalls in capabilities, the concept play an important role in actually supporting NATO 
transformational processes – although the respective centers are outside NCS. The logic of 
defense solidarity encourages the centers to support NATO transformational needs, and as 
one informant stated: “COEs agree to accept NATO as the “primary customer”43, a role that is 
further elaborated by SACT: 
“NATO COEs play a valuable role in Alliance transformation. They are a good 
example of cost-efficient cooperation amongst nations coordinated by NATO, as promoted by 
Smart Defense. Further development of COEs as education and trainings hubs is of the 
projects within the Smart Defense initiative. COEs offer much needed multinational solutions 
                                                
42 Interview with Gade 
43 E-mail interview with Storm 
55 
 
for transformation-related issues, as well as support to ongoing operations. They are an 
additional resource in terms of personnel and, in particular, subject matter experts.”44 
The role of supporting ongoing operations is also emphasized by rear admiral Jo Gade, and 
can prove to be very valuable combat service support elements in an operation. The clearest 
element of this “reach-back” aspect is from the Czech COE for Joint Chemical, Biological, 
Radioactive and Nuclear COE (COE-JCBRN), where 
“it has become a power asset, because you have this reach-back system. In an 
operation you suddenly stumble over something chemical, biological or radioactive, and 
instead of having expertise on all areas in every operation, you can have an expert system 
where you report back to a COE where experts eventually send staff to the operation 
theatre.”45 
Using COEs as ad hoc supporting “consultants” instead of embedding the experts into every 
single operation seems to be a cost-effective and multilateral solution that is in the very spirit 
of NATO transformation, and that according to the informants has the potential of becoming a 
valuable asset not only for operations, but also for the ongoing NATO transformation as a 
whole. 
The last role in executing transformation in NATO was the role in regard to NATO 
transformation that there was no empirical evidence to back up. The reason is apparent; COEs 
have no power or command authority in NATO since it is not part of NCS, which means that 
a center cannot pass binding decisions on the Alliance. It can still suggest doctrines, specific 
changes, and act as a consultant to the Alliance, but the way it is configured now it has no 
formal authority. As several of the informants state, the concept has an advisory role to ACT 
at the end of the day, meaning that it is up to NATO decision-making bodies to execute and 
make binding decisions – not COEs as such. 
5.2.2 Strategic Analysis of the COE Concept 
Having assessed the four institutional logics and what roles the concept play in NATO 
transformation, the last part of this chapter will present a strategic analysis of the COE 
concept. This part of the analysis is divided in two parts, the first one will discuss whether the 
COE concept is driven by NATO transformation strategic intentions (analyzing strategic 
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intention), whereas the second will answer whether COEs plays a strategic role in NATO 
transformation (analyzing strategic relevance and importance). 
Analyzing Strategic Intention 
The first part of this strategic analysis is whether the COE concept is a result of NATO 
transformation´s strategic intentions. The immediate answer to this question is that is hard to 
argue that the concept steered by transformation needs, in which ACT would have a central 
role. The main arguments for this is 1) the randomness of how the specific centers were 
established, combined with 2) framework state’s arguably strong desire for flag waving, and 
finally 3) how a framework state’s COE tasks itself with an area expertise.   
The first argument for why the COE concept was never driven by NATO transformation 
strategic intensions is apparent by investigating when the respective COEs where established. 
Whereas the first COE was established in 2004 (COE-JAPCC), the following centers have 
been accredited later (most of them between 2007 and 2010). Since the Prague summit in 
2002 and PCC, the Alliance decided to reform the organization so it had a leaner, more 
efficient, effective and a deployable command structure, and parallel to this there has been a 
downsizing of the organization that would have required national and multilateral initiatives 
to balance this reform. Whether the COE concept can be said to be a strategic element in 
balancing the organization in this respect, is somewhat implausible, especially given that there 
does not seem to be a link between the PCC in 2002 (and the subsequent MC-document 
regulating the COE-concept that came in December 2003) and the establishment of most 
COEs several years later.  
Another aspect of this first argument is that ACT has never instructed any states to establish 
any COEs (or tasking them a specific subject matter area for that sake). A result of the COE 
concept’s autonomy (and the Alliance’s political nature as such) has been that ACT actually 
cannot instruct any framework states or COEs. It is an importance principle that states offer 
their expertise to NATO themselves by seeking accreditation by ACT. This means that it is 
outside NATO’s reach to control in what direction the Alliance is to “drive transformation” 
through the COE concept, it has to come from the states themselves in a bottom-up approach. 
This lack of steering possibilities consequently leads to a lack of a necessary potential for 
NATO to take strategic leadership and control of the COE concept, and hence leading to an 
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unintended and arguably random establishment of what is now 16 COEs (and four in the 
process of gaining NATO accreditation).  
This aspect also needs to be seen in light of the second argument for why the COE concept’s 
evolvement cannot be said to evolve according to a logic where NATO transformational 
needs are in the center, namely framework state’s arguably strong desire to flag wave. In this 
regard, it is naive to believe that framework state strategy and intention for establishing and 
maintaining a COE is the same as NATOs strategy for transformation, which was also argued 
under the logic of defense sovereignty. The key question is whether a COE is established as a 
result of a state interest (flag waving) or as a result of NATO needs (to fill in transformational 
gaps). These two different strategic motivations for establishing a COE could of course be 
coherent, but since it is a framework state that seeks accreditation for a specific COE, and not 
NATO, it is reason to believe that the elements in a national strategic motivation to establish a 
center will outplay the elements in a NATO strategy for transformation – if these elements are 
not coherent. In other words, state interest, not alliance transformation needs, arguably 
dominates in terms of strategic intentions for a specific COE. 
The last argument for why the COE concept cannot be said to have evolved strategically 
intended according to NATO transformation from the start, is by investigating what roles and 
subject matters the specific center specialize in. According to my sources, a COE’s subject 
matter area has never been driven by neither transformational needs nor instructions from 
NATO. On the contrary, a COE’s field of expertise is a result of whatever abilities, 
capabilities and resources the framework state already has (often for a long time). Norway has 
always focused on cold weather operations (thus COE for Cold Weather Operations), Turkey 
has had long experience with ethnic conflicts and terrorism (thus COE for Defense against 
Terrorism), the French had a center for analysis and simulation for air operations (COE-
CASPOA) long before it got accredited by NATO (established formally in 1997 and 
accredited in 2008), just to name a few examples. Although the COE concept coordinates and 
collects all threads concerning the specter of subject matter areas that the concept represent, it 
has not evolved out of strategic needs, but rather out of a bottom up approach (flag waving) 
hand in hand with using the resources in terms of expertise that states offered NATO. This 
lack of control that ACT has had to relate to in regard to the COE concept has made it hard to 
manage according to NATO transformation strategic needs.  
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Despite elements of a bottom-up approach, it does seem that the strong logic of solidarity has 
adjusted the rather autonomous concept of COE to abide to NATO transformational strategic 
intentions communicated and coordinated through ACT. This indicates that there is 
potentially a lot of power in allowing states to keep a NATO flag associated with a specific 
expertise, although framework and supporting states do have a privilege in deciding how to 
administrate its capabilities and capacities. Although the COE concept does not seem to be 
driven by NATO transformation strategic intentions, the concept can still be an important 
strategic element in NATO transformation, and will be analyzed in the following sections in 
terms of looking closer at the concept’s strategic relevance and importance. 
Analyzing Strategic Relevance and Importance 
This second assessment requires two essential elements that need to be considered together to 
assess any degree of coherency between the two. The first element is based on the first part of 
this analysis, namely the concept´s rationale based on the four institutional logics within the 
COE concept and the following conclusions to draw a picture of the dominant set of reasons 
and what seems to be the logical base within the concept. The second element comprises of 
identifying some key guidelines in NATO transformation, which can be collected from the 
former chapter on “closing the capabilities gap”. These guidelines in NATO’s 
transformational strategy will be discussed first, whereas the actual assessment and 
comparison to strategic rationalities is presented later. The discussion and analyses of these 
two elements, and the key findings from research question one will then in the final part of 
this chapter be presented in the section on the COE concept´s rationale and roles (section 6.3). 
As presented in chapter four on “Closing the capabilities gap”, it was the PCC that really 
committed Alliance members politically to bring about improvements regard a number of 
specific defense capabilities, an in accordance to an agreed timetable, and focusing on specific 
areas. It also seems that PCC and the Prague Summit in 2002 was really set the guidelines for 
NATO transformation, and laid the principles for how transformation should be 
operationalized. This is not to say the actual content of PCC is relevant today, but that the 
guidelines that the PCC statement emphasizes are still important guidelines for today´s NATO 
transformation, as presented in the following section. 
The most important guideline, and perhaps the guideline that the PCC in itself advocated, is 
that transformation is dependent on identifying essential components needed to improve 
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operational capabilities, and that these components are tasked and given ownership to specific 
members, entities, or clusters of the former two. With a particular focus on national pledges 
to meet agreed shortcomings over an agreed timetable, this guideline seeks realistic and 
attainable targets that tasks, and consequently commits, states individually or with other allies 
to specific capability improvements. 
Another important guideline is that NATO must focus on role specialization in order for the 
Alliance to advance and drive transformation, implying that states must choose to direct 
resources to areas where they have particular strengths while abandoning the attempt to 
maintain some other capabilities. Such ideas however, run counter to the understandable 
principle of maintaining the widest possible range of state defense capabilities as insurance 
against worst-case contingencies. Nevertheless, it is one of the most important elements in 
NATO transformation, and often implies what is the third guideline, namely that there is an 
appropriate pooling of military capabilities. This means that multilateral solutions are 
encouraged, since it sometimes would not be rational to acquire the full specter of 
competencies and capabilities. Along with role specialization and pooling of military 
capabilities, comes the quest for interoperability, which is a fundamental principle for allied 
operations – namely that states must be able to operate and communicate together in allied 
operations and exercises. This guideline is important to achieve unity in command and effort 
in the battlefield, and is based on previous lessons learned from former and ongoing military 
operations. 
The arguments for more role specialization and further pooling of certain military capabilities 
have been frequently supported by a guideline that seems to be more and more popular in 
political speeches, namely the principle of cost-effectiveness. This guideline for NATO’s 
transformational strategy can be illustrated and explained in two ways. First of all, along with 
the goals and guidelines of transformation, a NATO command structure reform has also taken 
place. As a result, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) tasked the MC to conduct a Peacetime 
Establishment review of the Alliance’s command structure in July 2006, including dedicated 
headquarters and other NATO installations, to identify a military structure that is more 
effective with regard to operational and transformational tasks, and more affordable in 
manpower and ﬁnancial terms. An overall consequence of these reforms was fewer personnel 
warrants, and less room for subject matter experts in NATOs command structure. Secondly, 
cost-effectiveness means “getting more bang for the buck” for state defense spending. This 
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implies that Allies spend their money more wisely and effectively, and states are often 
encouraged to seek multilateral solutions to avoid unnecessary duplication of capabilities.  
With the upcoming Chicago Summit in May 2012, one could ask whether the Smart Defense 
concept is a guideline for NATO transformation. The concept, which was branded by NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh-Rasmussen, illustrates all of the guidelines mentioned above, 
but seems to be no more than a political concept that encourages Allies (particularly in times 
of austerity) to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to 
meet current security problems in accordance with the new NATO strategic concept, which 
means pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better. In 
other words, Smart Defense is a political concept that is used to sell and promote defense 
solutions that supports all of the guidelines of NATO transformation, and is not treated as a 
transformation strategy guideline in this analysis. Having that said, the strong encouragements 
to do “Smart Defence” seems to manage to gather allied states to get together and follow the 
transformational guidelines, and must nevertheless not be underestimated. 
This means that the key thoughts, concepts and guidelines in NATO transformational strategy 
seem to be the following: 
n National commitments 
n Role specialization 
n Pooling of military capabilities 
n Interoperability 
n Cost-effectiveness 
 
Having the five guidelines for NATO transformational strategy in mind, a matching of these 
with the logics that has been identified within the COE concept (in research question one) will 
be conducted, and answer whether the COE concept is strategically relevant and important for 
NATO transformation. The following sections will first discuss strategic relevance and 
importance for a transformational strategy as presented in the former sections, and finally try 
to see if the empirical evidence can indicate any degree of the concept´s importance to NATO 
transformation. 
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Is the COE Concept Strategic Relevant and Important to NATO 
Transformation? 
It is evident that the COE concept is indeed of strategic relevance for NATO transformation 
according to its strategic guidelines. The dominant institutional logics from the first research 
question along with the configuration of the COE concept regulated through the basic 
principles, clearly show that the concept’s rationale is promoting and supporting the same 
guidelines for NATO transformation as presented in the former section.   
It is obvious that the concept is configured and executed in the respective COEs, and that is 
consistent with the guideline for committing the states in driving transformation. Through the 
multilateral organizational solution consisting of framework and supporting states, the 
involved states are extra exposed and expected to contribute to a specific subject matter area. 
With the developments in NATO transformation and the command structure reforms in mind, 
it seems that neither state nor Alliance-led solutions are efficient solutions to address specific 
shortfalls and gaps in capabilities. In this respect, the COE concept and its ability to focus on 
something in between, namely clusters of states, it seems to be a sustainable solution that can 
achieve the guidelines. As a result, a sharing of costs is also inherent within the concept, 
supporting the pooling of military capabilities guideline. Although it is neither pooling nor 
specific military capabilities, the COE concept is coherent with the guideline in the sense that 
the supporting states “split the bill” on whatever costs that are related to a specific center. 
Furthermore, the COE concept follows a strict rule of “division of labor”, and thus following 
the role specialization guideline, which means that each respective center has a special 
ownership to a defined subject matter area. This “ownership” however does not imply 
exclusiveness to a specific subject matter area. Even though a COE center has an area of 
expertise that no other COE has, it still has to relate to subject matter experts (and other 
defense officials) both in the NATO command structure and in state defense command 
structures.  
Perhaps the most evident guideline is the foundation for the COE concept as such, namely the 
quest for interoperability. Getting states together to educate leaders and specialists from 
NATO member and partner countries, assist in doctrine development, identify lessons 
learned, improve capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation are all 
activities that are in the center of improving Alliance interoperability. Above all, adjusting 
NATO doctrine (and preparing Allied forces to adhere to these changes) to new Alliance 
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political security objectives and guidelines and strategic military direction is of the essence 
within a COE, and further supporting the argument that the COE concept is coherent with 
NATO transformation guidelines. 
The last guideline is cost-effectiveness, and is a NATO transformation guideline that is also 
very evident in the concept of COE. As a few of my informants argued, the whole reason that 
the whole concept is placed outside NCS is because of command structure reforms and 
reductions in personnel warrant and demands for cost-effectiveness and a leaner organization. 
Since the COE concept is not at the expense of NATO personnel warrants, it is thus cost-
effective for NATO as an institution, and for the alliance as a whole. If it is perceived as cost-
effective for the states that pay for a specific center however, is more uncertain, but for now 
the evidence indicate that states perceive these costs as natural to cover, and actually also as 
an investment since the advantages of paying is to get a NATO flag on their national soil. 
By reviewing the five guidelines from NATO transformation, the COE concept is indeed 
coherent with the five strategic guidelines for NATO transformation. Consequently, it can be 
clear that the COE concept is of strategic relevance for NATO transformation in the sense that 
all the potentials and criteria for transforming NATO are fulfilled, but what about strategic 
importance? Can these findings be used to conclude that the COE concept is an (un)important 
element in NATO transformation? Answering this question would need a thorough evaluation 
on what importance COEs have on NATO transformation, which is an evaluation that is first 
of all methodically demanding, and second which is neither a focal point nor an ambition for 
this thesis. Nonetheless, the informants do stress two things that are worth mentioning to get 
an impression of the concept’s importance to NATO transformation. First, they advocate the 
COE concept as an important element in NATO transformation, and second that the concept 
has an enormous potential in contributing even more and becoming spearheads for 
transformation in their subject matter areas if they are exploited properly. These two 
perceptions indicate that the concept’s importance should not be underestimated in NATO 
transformation, and should also be subject for further studies.  
5.3 The COE Concept’s Rationale and Roles 
Which institutional logics dominate the COE concept, what role(s) do(es) the COE concept 
play in the field of defense transformation in NATO, and what is the concept’s strategic 
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intention, relevance and importance?? The main findings that answer the research questions 
can be summed up by the following bullet points, and will be elaborated in the following 
sections. 
• The logic of defense solidarity (logic 2) and logic of defense pluralism (logic 4) 
dominate the COE concept, but the logic of defense sovereignty (specifically national 
interest) shone through in terms of organizing the actual COEs. 
• In regard to NATO transformation, the concept seems primarily to play an identifying 
and supporting role, whereas it does not have an operative or executing role in 
transformation. 
• The concept does not seem to have evolved according to NATO transformational 
strategic intentions, but the COE concept is nevertheless of strategic relevance for 
NATO transformation in the sense that all the potentials and criteria for transforming 
NATO are fulfilled. 
• The findings also carefully indicate that the concept is of strategic importance for 
NATO transformation, but its actual effect on transformation should be evaluated in 
separate studies. 
The first point analyzed four institutional logics, and found that the logic of defense solidarity 
and defense pluralism seemed to dominate throughout the empirical evidence collected 
through interviews with key COE staff/affiliates. The autonomous COE concept, which is 
neither connected to NCS nor state command structures, first of all seems to have a stronger 
loyalty and sense of belonging to NATO. The notable exception to this was in terms of 
organizing the respective COEs, in which the respondents made it clear that it is approproate 
that framework and supporting states are responsible for how the centers should be organized 
and run. The opposing logic of defense solidarity on the other hand, was the dominating 
perception of what was appropriateness concerning that the COE’s POWs are directed by (in 
this case NATO, and not state interests and needs). In the second pair of institutional logics, 
the logic of defense pluralism was clearly the most dominating logic, supporting the 
perceptions that partnerships and civil-military cooperation are of vital importance for the 
concept, and that effective information sharing is of the essence in carrying out what is 
expected of the concept. 
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The second point clearly showed that, in NATO transformation, the COE concept primarily 
played an identifying and supporting role in NATO transformation. The role that was not 
perceived as a role that COE had was in terms of executing transformation. The informants 
were clear on the point that since the concept was outside both NATO and state command 
structure, it only had an advisory role for NATO transformation. In practice the concept can 
present solutions and ideas for promoting transformation, but at the end of the day it is 
NATO’s prerogative to make any binding decisions. 
The two last points are from the last part of the analysis that assessed the concept’s strategic 
intention, relevance and importance. I found that there was a sense of randomness and a 
bottom-up approach in the concept’s development, which made it hard to argue that its course 
and nature was subject to strategic steering and leadership. Although the findings could not 
fully conclude that the concept was strategically intended, it does seem to be of strategic 
relevance in the sense that the concept’s features match the guidelines for NATO 
transformational strategy. The findings finally indicated that the concept is important in 
NATO transformation, but since the research questions does not involve effect evaluation of 
the COE concept, this could and should be done in separate studies to gain a further 
understanding of the concept. 
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6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Transformation in NATO has been a recurring and constant theme in the Alliance since DCI 
and PCC, and is an important theme although rebranded as Smart Defense. This thesis has 
sought to identify and map out different institutional logics of what is perceived as 
appropriate by key personnel within and affiliated with the concept, and to analyze the 
concept’s roles and rationale, especially in regard to the overall transformation NATO. Two 
questions have guided this analysis, namely which institutional logics that can be identified on 
how the COE concept and specific centers s be organized, and what roles the concept plays in 
the field of defense transformation in NATO, and what the concept’s strategic intensions, 
relevance and importance is.  
The research question has been answered using a new institutionalist perspective, where the 
purpose has been to understand the dynamics of the COE concept. Constructing institutional 
logics and matching the empirical evidence to these logics and their respective theoretical 
expectations has consequently led to the analysis in which I have concluded that a logic of 
defense solidarity and defense pluralism are dominant, as opposed to the less dominant logic 
of sovereignty and the logic of exclusiveness that was not found to be evident at all. 
Furthermore, in analyzing strategic roles I have found that the two most evident roles the 
concept plays in NATO transformation are identifying and supporting specific 
transformational efforts. Finally, I have found it implausible to conclude that COE concept is 
strategic intentional regarded from a NATO transformational perspective, but rather is a 
bottom-up phenomenon without central steering. Nevertheless, the concept is strategically 
relevant for NATO transformation in the sense that it is coherent with transformational 
strategic guidelines, and also seems to be an important element although this conclusion needs 
further research and evaluation. Given these findings and conclusions, a discussion of some 
theoretical and practical implications of this study can now be presented in light of the 
“bigger picture”. 
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6.1 Theoretical Implications 
There are in particular two important theoretical implications that are worth mentioning. 
These are 1) fruitfulness of the theory of logic of appropriateness 2) whether the dominant 
institutional logics can be representative of a development in the mechanisms and dynamics 
of contemporary armed forces.  
First of all the four logics employed in this study contributes to a further and systematized 
understanding of the concept, and the approach has been fruitful in understanding what the 
dominant logics are – and how they affect the sources of power, its meaning, and its 
consequences and sanctions within the COE concept. The logic of appropriateness as a base 
for the analytical framework of the thesis has managed to identify the rules that apply within 
the COE concept, and must therefore be said to be fruitful in this study. The institutional 
logics and the analysis have furthermore successfully served as constituents for the concept´s 
rationale, in this sense the COE concept´s set of reasons or logical basis. 
Two particular episodes show how consequences and sanctions have actually changed 
behavior as a result of the rules for appropriateness within the COE concept. The first episode 
showed that the principle that all involved parties must have equal access to information 
(logic of defense pluralism) was superior, in a case where an information-sharing regime 
normally would have hindered certain parts access to an operational assessment done by a 
COE. The second one was when a state tried to trump through their national interest in a 
specific COE´s POW, on behalf of the other contributing nations and NATO as whole. This 
nation was according to the empirical materials “put in its place”, and shows that a logic of 
solidarity is strong enough to sanction any attempt to contest this logic. This illustrates the 
power of an institutional logic; it can outmaneuver formal agreements and rules in situations 
where it is not perceived as appropriate, and the new institutionalist approach employed in 
this thesis does indeed demonstrate an explanatory value in understanding the dynamics and 
mechanisms in the COE concept. 
A clear limitation to the theory´s fruitfulness and usefulness is its limitation for defining 
appropriate behavior over time, as it may change. As Christensen & Rørvik (1999) argues, 
longitudinal studies will show that new rules (and identities) might appear while old ones 
disappear, become altered or are temporarily downplayed. The theory does not address 
reasons and explanations for how these changes in institutionalized logics of appropriateness 
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occur. As stated in under the assessment on the studies reliability (section 3.3), if the same 
study were to be repeated in ten years from now, the results would therefore probably be quite 
different. This is a weakness in the sense that logics are not valid over time (and does not 
achieve reliability). Despite this, if a more or less identical study is conducted ten years from 
now, it might turn out to be a strength to the theory as such. This is because one can compare 
the changes that have occurred over time, and try to explain the changes in institutionalized 
rules of appropriateness between the two studies. Despite this not being a truly experimental 
research design in which ceteris paribus is achieved, the findings from a study like this might 
nevertheless address the reliability flaws of this theory, and even offer an understanding of the 
causal mechanisms of the institutional logics, this strengthening the theory. 
The other implication is whether the matching of the empirical evidence to institutional 
logics, and particularly their theoretical basis, are representative of a development in the 
mechanisms and dynamics of contemporary armed forces. The main findings in the analysis 
does show that the dominance of the logics of defense solidarity and defense pluralism does 
indeed indicate that there has been a depart from more traditional notions on defense, as based 
on a Weberian notion of defense, where key characteristics were defense completely led from 
the state, and that the military was distinguished and separated from the civil society. Instead, 
the evidence points in the direction supporting Moskos, Williams, and Segal’s arguments that 
there are tendencies that armed forces is going through organizational change that result in 
tighter links between military and civilian spheres, and there is a development of 
multinational integration of military, especially through international military organizations. 
Whether this is enough evidence to support the “postmodern military” that these three authors 
advocate is uncertain, but it certainly supports Østerud and Matlary’s alleged tendencies for 
internationalization and privatization of military armed forces. 
6.2 Practical Implications 
Understanding the institutional logics will therefore make us better able to understand 
decision-making processes and outcomes in this particular type of concept. Not only does the 
logics offer good reflections on the dominating thoughts and perspectives, the analysis can 
(and should) also be used in making or adjusting strategies in managing the concept. It seems 
apparent that the concept can run into certain risks of conflict and ineffectiveness that run out 
of the four ambiguous and competing logics. One could however argue that addressing these 
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risks and implications have no place in an analytical study of this kind, but given that there 
were important practical reasons for why the COE concept was chosen as a study object, the 
practical implications of the conclusions and findings are nevertheless presented in the 
following sections. 
Using the findings from this study can therefore be useful in discussing some practical 
implications that seem to be embedded within the COE concept, and that should/could be 
mitigated and managed properly. Two practical implications in particular that could be of 
interest will therefore be discussed in the following section, namely how the logic of 
sovereignty should be supervised properly especially in times of austerity (practical 
implication #1), and some obvious strengths that lie within the concept and that can be 
valuable if exploited further (practical implication #2). 
Practical Implication #1: States Should Govern their COEs, but Beware of the 
Challenges That Follow Times of Austerity 
Although the logic of sovereignty was only found in regard to organizing COEs, this 
discovery should nevertheless be taken seriously especially concerning challenges that show 
up in times of austerity. One of the informants carefully implied especially one important 
aspect in terms of organizing a COE, namely filling the positions and PEs as stated in a 
specific COE MOU and/or functional arrangements. In last few years most states in NATO 
have experienced severe cuts in defense budgets46, and it is reasonable to expect that these 
cuts can and will lead to reduction in personnel in non-state defense positions. Since COEs 
formally is an independent international military organization that seems to be following a 
logic of defense sovereignty according to the empirical evidence, the involved states’ 
obligations, and their obligation of filling personnel vacancies in particular, should be 
monitored closely and over time to see how cuts in defense might affect the COE concept and 
its rationale and roles. 
A second aspect of the COE concept’s autonomy is that the very autonomy in itself becomes a 
threat that should not be forgotten. Although the empirical evidence and the institutional 
logics prescribe very low probabilities that this autonomy becomes a threat, it is not given that 
a logic of defense solidarity will be strong forever. Following the same argument from the 
                                                
46 See specifically http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex for development in military 
expenditure % of GDP 
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former paragraph, state interest can outmaneuver the notion of solidarity in desperate times, 
which could consequently lead to “rogue” COEs, in the sense that they start operating by 
themselves and according to their own rationale and interest – and in the worst case in 
opposition to both state and allied interest at the same time. 
Practical Implication #2: Potential Opportunities 
The second practical implication of this analysis is identifying how dominating institutional 
logics can be utilized to identify key potential opportunities that arguably lie within the COE 
concept. In general, the COE concept seems to be undercommunicated, and making the 
concept and its services and opportunities more visible for the Alliance and its members 
might be an ambition so that potential new stakeholders in the concept can exploit it better.  
Having that said, the following sections will briefly mention three opportunities in particular 
that were mentioned explicitly, namely the potential for improving ties with NGOs, the 
possibilities for strengthening intra-institutional cooperation between EU and NATO, and 
finally the potential for specific COEs to offer capabilities that can be exploited in (relation 
to) ongoing threats or operations. These three potential are all valuable especially for NATO 
since the COE concept follows a strong logic of defense solidarity. COEs must therefore be 
considered as a valuable asset in order to exploit any possibilities that NATO otherwise would 
struggle to achieve. 
The first practical implications deals with non-governmental organizations (NGO), and is a 
point that was elaborated in the first part of the former chapter, namely that it seems that 
cooperating with NGOs might be easier since the COE concept is exempted from any type of 
traditional military structure. The example was in regard to the CIMIC COE, but it is clear 
that there is a significant potential of establishing cooperation with NGOs at the local level, 
and not least with central NGOs and IGOs on specific subject matter areas. These types of 
relationships could first of all improve the expertise of a given subject matter by including 
non-military aspects that might be neglected by a sole military rationality, and would 
nevertheless strengthen ties with important organizations that, of several reasons, never 
cooperate formally with either NATO or state military command structures. Particularly 
NGOs and some international governmental organizations (IGOs) thrive for a neutral, 
objective and non-military profile, which can arguably be maintained even though there is 
cooperation with a COE. 
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The second opportunity that the COE concept can offer is a “backdoor” for cooperation 
between EU and NATO. Due to the Cyprus-conflict and the challenges of reaching 
effectiveness and consensus is demanding in both EU and NATO, cooperation on the 
institutional level between the two is far from ideal, nor effective. Using COEs though, and as 
the empirical evidence have exemplified, can be a way to start a cooperation at a lower level 
by “dodging” the decision-making bodies on the institutional level, and consequently the 
challenges of effectiveness and consensus and the Cyprus-conflict. Since it seems that closer 
ties between EU and NATO is wanted from both sides (especially in times of austerity), this 
potential should also be exploited to the maximum – a potential that seems to be a win-win 
situation for both parties and for European defense as such. 
The final opportunity that the informants seemed to be enthusiastic about, is giving the COEs 
concrete roles in (ongoing) threats and operations. The example given on the COE-CBRNs 
“reach-back” role should be looked further into, and assessed whether similar (or adapted) 
solutions can be tailor-made at other COEs, thus further exploiting the hundreds of subject 
matter experts involved in COEs. Establishing this capability and making it available 
whenever a given situation needs it, will lead to a more visible and relevant COE concept for 
the whole of NATO and its members, and perhaps also furthering the Alliance’s importance 
for traditional security and newer dimensions and conceptions of security. This might be 
especially important in times where many argue that NATO might have outplayed (or at least 
weakened) its role for article V operations and territorial defense and security. Playing on this 
particular opportunity might therefore support what Norway calls the Core Area Initiative, in 
which NATO continue to undertake operations "out of area", and outside Article 5, provided 
that these operations are firmly based on a clear UN mandate, but at the same time striking the 
right balance between "home" and "away" focus for the Alliance. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This thesis started off with the notion that NATO has to adapt “how it fights” to “why it 
fights”, and that transformation is the process for these adjustments along the way. The 
findings of this analysis have argued that the COE concept is a policy initiative with roles and 
rationale that is significant to NATO transformation. However, the scope of the study and the 
COE concept as such only contributes one little piece to the complex puzzle on the 
overarching strategic question on how to adjust “how to fight” to “why to fight”. Considering 
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the diversity and ambiguity of the new strategic concept from the latest NATO summit in 
Lisbon 2010, answering how NATO should adapt these diverging views is further complex –
not least on how to match how to why. Although this study only offers an in-depth 
understanding of one specific piece of contribution in NATO transformation, it is nevertheless 
a contribution of the few in understanding actual outcomes from NATO transformational 
processes. It might be helpful in understanding transformation as a whole, but also be helpful 
to policy makers that can use the study´s findings to identify strengths, weaknesses, threats 
and opportunities. Should this thesis turn out not be of practical of theoretical relevance, it 
will hopefully at least be inspiring for other scholars that seek to analyze and study alternative 
organizational solutions and contributions related to the field of (NATO) defense 
transformation. 
 
72 
 
Appendix A – Informants 
Name Rank Position/COE affiliation Interview carried through 
Kjell Ove Orderud Skare Maj Gen (genmaj) Former deputy chief of staff, ACT, 
Norfolk, VA 
Informal conversation 
October 7th 2011, personal 
interview November 28th 
2011 
Jo Gade Rear Adm (ret) 
(kontreadmiral) 
Deputy Director International 
Military Staff (IMS) NATO, Brussels, 
champion on transformation 
Informal conversation, 
personal interview January 
26th 2012 
Rune Jensen Lt Col (oblt) Senior staff officer, Norwegian 
Ministry of Defense, Department of 
Security Policy  
Personal interview January 
31st 2012 
Rune Nyaas Commander 
(kommandørkaptein) 
Norwegian Senior National 
Representative, Combined Joint 
Operations from the Sea COE 
(CJOS), Norfolk, VA 
E-mail correspondence 
(questionnaire)  
Geir Furø Lt Col (oblt) Former Norwegian Senior National 
Representative, Command and 
Control COE (C2), Utrecht, the 
Netherlands 
Personal interview January 
27th 2012 
Terje Roa Lt Col (oblt) Senior Norwegian National 
Representative, Joint Air Power 
Competence Centre of Excellence 
(JAPCC), Kalkar, Germany 
E-mail correspondence 
(questionnaire) and follow-
up telephone interview 
Ove Sandli Lt Col (oblt) Chief COE for Cold Weather 
Operations (CWO), Bodo, Norway 
Informal conversation, e-
mail correspondence 
(various) 
Jørgen Berggrav Rear Adm (ret) 
(kontreadmiral) 
Former SACT’s representative in 
Europe + National Military 
representative to SHAPE 
Personal interview February 
29th 2012 
Helmar Storm Colonel (ob) Chief for Transformation Network 
Branch, ACT, Norfolk, VA. 
E-mail correspondence 
(questionnaire)  
Stéphane Abrial General (gen) Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation, Norfolk, Virginia 
Online Q&A through a 
security policy website 
called Atlantic 
Community47, and received 
an answer on this that is 
used in the thesis. 
 
                                                
47 See http://www.atlantic-
community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/General_Abrial%27s_Answers%3A_Part_1
_-_Smart_Defense 
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Appendix B – Illustrative Interview 
Guide 
 
1 Background and experiences, emphasis on NATO-positions. Specifically on what roles you 
have for /in relation to COE  
 
2 Transformation in NATO has been and still is an important issue in the Alliance. What do 
you perceive as the most important goals and methods that the COE concept has and uses to 
contribute to transformation? 
• How is COE significant in NATO transformation? 
• Are framework and sponsoring states coherent and in sync on these goals and 
methods? 
• Who benefits the most of your COE? 
•  
 
3 What interests does Norway have to support this specific COE, and how do we contribute 
without competence and resources? 
• Does Norwegian interests come in conflict with other interests and actors, which/who 
and how? 
• Do you perceive Norway is achieving its interests by contributing to this COE? Are 
we getting ”bang for the buck”? 
•  
 
4 Is there a conflict between NATO solidarity and state interests considering what your COE 
should work on? 
• How does this conflict outplay itself with today’s organization and work methods? 
• How do you as a Norwegian officer deal with these competing expectations between 
Norwegian, COE and NATO interests? 
• Why do you thing host states establish COEs? 
•  
 
5 How do ACT and COE cooperate, and how do they communicate?  
• Given that COE formally is an independent organization, how decisive and directive 
are signals from ACT? How often does your COE receive requests for support, and 
how (quickly) are they managed? 
• What is the mentality on cooperating with non-military entities (EU/PfP, universities, 
research and development institutes, industry, etc), and how does this cooperation 
work? 
•  
 
6 Anything unmentioned? 
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Appendix C – Executive Summary 
This summary is intended for practitioners and decision-makers. 
This study has studied the rationale and role of the COE concept, and sought to analyze it in 
light of NATO transformation. It is has used institutional logics (assumption that the 10 
informants of the study fulfill particular identities by following rules and procedures that they 
imagine as appropriate to the situations they are facing) as basis for the concept´s rationale. 
This rationale and the concept´s principles as such are consequently used to assess its role in 
NATO transformation. 
The answers are summed up the following bullet points: 
• A strong NATO loyalty and an inclination to include non-traditional actors dominate the 
concept, but the logic of defense sovereignty (specifically national interest) shone 
through in terms of organizing the respective COEs. 
• In regard to NATO transformation, the concept seems to primarily play an identifying 
and supporting role, whereas it does not have an operative or executing role in 
transformation. 
• The concept does not seem to have evolved according to NATO transformational 
strategic intentions, but the COE concept is nevertheless of strategic relevance for NATO 
transformation in the sense that all the potentials and criteria for transforming NATO are 
fulfilled. 
• The findings also carefully indicate that the concept is strategic important for NATO 
transformation, but its actual effect on transformation should be evaluated in separate 
studies. 
 
The findings have some practical implications, in which some are elaborated in the final 
chapter of this thesis. These are: 
• States should govern their COEs, but beware of the challenges that follow times of 
austerity: The finding that national interest (under defence sovereignty) dominates on 
notion on who should organize a center. How this plays out in times of austerity should 
be looked into, specially how this might affect filling personnel warrants (PE) and live 
up to the obligations nations have agreed upon in a MOU or technical/functional 
agreements. The concept might also be exposed to conflict between national and NATO 
interests, and this risk should be continuously mitigated. 
• Potential opportunities: The empirical findings reveal some possible opportunities that 
the informants perceive as natural to look into. Except from marketing the respective 
centers and their potential more, these opportunities are: 
• Engage more actively with NGOs, and exploit the relationship to the fullest through 
the COE concept. 
• Use the COE concept to advance closer cooperation between NATO and external 
partners like EU and PfP countries. 
• Assess how and where the COEs can be given concrete roles in (ongoing) threats and 
operations. This will exploit the many subject matter experts in realistic scenarios, and 
hopefully revitalize the COE concepts role in transformation and in NATO as such. 
 
Comments or questions are most welcome at seanmlobo@gmail.com (Sean Lobo) 
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